By Albert Mohler
AlbertMohler.com
http://www.albertmohler.com/2013/04/01/bracketing-morality-the-marginalization-of-moral-argument-in-the-same-sex-marriage-debate/
“Somewhere along the way, standing up for gay marriage went from
nervy to trendy.” This was the assessment offered by Frank Bruni, an
influential openly-gay columnist for The New York Times.
Bruni’s column, published just as the Supreme Court was poised to hear
oral arguments in the two same-sex marriage cases now before it, is a
celebration of the fact that, as he sees it, same-sex marriage is soon
to be the law of the land, whatever the Court may decide. “The
trajectory is undeniable. The trend line is clear. And the choice before
the justices is whether to be handmaidens of history, or whether to sit
it out.”
Bruni may well be right, given the trajectory and the trend-line he
has described. Of course, Bruni, along with his fellow columnists,
editors, and reporters for The New York Times will, along with
their friends in the larger world of elite media, bear much of the
responsibility for this. They are certain that their work is the mission
of human liberation from irrational prejudice.
In the most important section of Bruni’s column, he writes: “In an
astonishingly brief period of time, this country has experienced a
seismic shift in opinion — a profound social and political revolution —
when it comes to gay and lesbian people.”
That is a powerful summary of what has happened. Bruni is
undoubtedly right, and he has helped to make it so. But there is
something missing from Bruni’s analysis, and this is something that he
has helped to cause as well. The “seismic shift” on the issue of
homosexuality is a profound moral revolution as well.
And yet, what makes this moral revolution so vast in consequences and
importance is this: the moral dimension has virtually disappeared from
the cultural conversation. This is true, we must note, even among the
defenders of heterosexual marriage.
This is not to say that those who now defend the natural and
venerable definition of marriage deny the existence of a moral argument,
nor to imply that they are anything less than fully in agreement with
the historic and scriptural assessment of the Christian church that
homosexual acts and relationships are sinful. We must, however, note
that the current intellectual environment has forced them to leave the
moral issue behind — far behind.
Eric Teetsel, executive director of the Manhattan Declaration, also
contributed a column just as the Supreme Court was to hear the same-sex
marriage cases last week. Teetsel wrote in defense of marriage as the
union of a man and a woman, arguing that society has an interest in
defending the historic definition of the marital union as “the first
institution of society” and “the society that creates and nurtures the
next generation.”
But Teetsel’s column, published in USA Today, also included
this statement: “This understanding requires no judgment about the
morality of homosexuality.” He went on to argue that many non-marital
relationships, including same-sex romantic couples, “are worthy of
rights and relationships,” but the state’s interest in marriage is its
ability to create and nurture children. But, he insists, this concern
“requires no judgment about the morality of homosexuality.”
The same approach is reflected in the very best book defending natural marriage from a natural law perspective. What is Marriage? by Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, and Robert P. George is a brilliant defense of marriage and a tour de force
in terms of intellectual argument. The book is actually an extension of
an important article by the three authors that originally appeared in
the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy.
In the book, the authors begin with this declaration: “What we have
come to call the gay marriage debate is not directly about
homosexuality, but about marriage.” That is a truly interesting
statement, but it actually points to what these three authors want the argument to be about, not to what the larger culture thinks the argument is about.
Later, the authors make this statement about their argument in
defense of marriage. “First, it is not in the end about homosexuality.
We do not address the morality of homosexual acts or their heterosexual
counterparts. We will show that one can defend the conjugal view of
marriage while bracketing this moral question and that the conjugal view
can be wholeheartedly embraced without denigrating same-sex attracted
people, or ignoring their needs, or assuming that their desires should
change.”
The brilliance of this book lies in its careful distinction between two rival views of marriage — the conjugal
view, which defines marriage as “a bodily as well as an emotional and
spiritual bond” which sustains the world through the creation and
nurture of children, and the revisionist view, which defines
marriage as “a loving emotional bond, one distinguished by its
intensity, with no reference to a duty beyond its partners. The conjugal
view, based in the function of the family and the nurture of children,
points to lifelong fidelity. The revisionist view points to a
relationship based on emotional intensity in which the partners remain
“as long as they find it.”
This argument is vitally important, even essential, to any
conversation about marriage in our modern context, for it points far
beyond the issue of same-sex marriage to the prior assaults on conjugal
marriage brought by no-fault divorce and the replacement of personal
responsibility with mere personal autonomy. Sadly, the revisionist view
of marriage is embraced by millions of heterosexual couples, married and
unmarried, but it is essential to the very idea of same-sex marriage.
The argument offered by Girgis, Anderson, and George will stand the
test of time. It is the very best public argument yet presented from the
defenders of marriage. And yet it brackets the question of the morality
of homosexuality. The authors are not making a moral argument,
presumably dependent upon a religious authority, but a natural law
argument accessible to all by common reason.
And yet, their argument is not well received by the proponents of
same-sex marriage and it remains to be seen if their argument will gain
any traction in the larger culture. In any event, it is an argument
stripped of explicit moral concern.
During the oral arguments before the Supreme Court, the attorneys
defending Proposition 8 and the Defense of Marriage Act [DOMA] followed
the same lines of argument, strictly avoiding any reference to a moral
judgment against homosexuality or homosexual unions.
Why are these authors and attorneys so careful to excise the moral
argument? They believe that it is necessary before the Supreme Court,
and before the court of public opinion.
The Court’s oral arguments on the DOMA case made the risks of moral
argument clear. Justice Elena Kagan, pressing Attorney Paul Clement, the
lawyer defending DOMA, asked him if Congress had made a moral judgment
in adopting the Defense of Marriage Act. She then read from a House of
Representatives report, issued in advance of the vote on DOMA, in which a
clear moral argument was made. That report included these sentences:
“Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a
collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails
both moral disapproval of homosexuality, [and] moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially
Judeo-Christian) morality.”
Keep in mind that both houses of Congress then approved the law by
massive votes, and that the Act was then signed into law by President
Bill Clinton. All parties knew, and publicly affirmed, that they were
making a moral judgment.
But all that is now part of the problem, legally speaking. In his
decision striking down California’s Proposition 8, U.S. District Judge
Vaughn Walker argued: “The evidence shows conclusively that Proposition 8
enacts, without reason, a private moral view that same-sex couples are
inferior to opposite-sex couples.” Judge Walker dismissed all moral
judgment against homosexual conduct as a matter of merely private moral
opinion, presumably drawn from religious sources.
Back in 2003, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in
the landmark case, Lawrence v. Texas, that struck down all laws
criminalizing homosexual acts. Kennedy argued that moral opposition to
homosexuality was not a rational basis for the establishment of a law.
In response, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that Kennedy had just
eliminated any legal barrier to same-sex marriage. “If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate state interest’
for purposes of proscribing that conduct … what justification could
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples exercising ‘the liberty protected by the Constitution?’”
Those words are now seen as deeply prophetic. The removal of moral
disapproval from this legal context set the stage for the inevitable
controversy we are now experiencing — and for the removal of morality
from the public conversation. If anything, the court of public opinion,
driven by those who control the media, entertainment, and the public
conversation, is far ahead of the law courts in this respect.
But consider the implications of this bracketing of moral argument.
What, other than morality, sustains any laws restricting human sexual
behavior?
The legislative debate over the prohibition of polygamy after the
Civil War was explicitly moral. Sociological analysis did not drive that
movement, morality did. What about all the other laws that restrict
sexual acts? Are they also to be cast down by this logic?
Moral judgment under girds the entire structure of laws and is
necessary for the rational structure of any significant statute. The
idea that our laws can stand independent of moral foundation is
senseless. We do not think that driving under the influence of alcohol
is simply risky, in terms of statistics. We believe that it is wrong, in terms of explicit moral judgment.
The point here is not to criticize those who, working within the
confines of public reason and prevailing constrictions, do their best —
and often brilliantly so — to defend marriage without moral judgment.
But we should note this change in the rules of public debate with
more than a passing interest; for the implications of this moral
revolution are more vast than anyone can yet foresee. At stake is not
only the ability to express moral judgment about homosexuality, but
about any sexual behavior. Further, this logic cannot be restricted to
public debates about sexuality. This revolution goes far beyond marriage
and sex.
Subjected to public ridicule on CNN’s “Piers Morgan Tonight,” Ryan T.
Anderson did his best to argue the case for marriage, avoiding moral
judgment on homosexuality. He was unconscionably mistreated and
marginalized. In the course of the show Piers Morgan told Anderson, the
William E. Simon Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, that he was in
danger of being found on the wrong side of history. Anderson retorted:
“There is no wrong side of history apart from what the truth is.”
That statement is profoundly true, and it is profoundly moral.
Without moral judgment there is no truth, and with truth there is no
moral judgment. And there is no wrong side of history, apart from what
the truth is.