by Alastair Roberts
Alastair's Adversaria
The following is a comment I posted on an online friend’s blog. I posted a comment pushing back against the idea that Trump supporters were largely driven by misogyny and racism, suggesting that a more charitable and optimistic construction of the situation was possible. In response, another commenter claimed that I had been ‘mansplaining’. I wrote the lengthy comment below in response. I thought I would reshare it here, as it develops, unpacks, and concretizes some of the issues raised in my earlier two posts.
I have changed the names of the two people concerned.
Samantha, I want to thank you for raising this, because it is an important point.
Do you want to know why I am here?
I am here because I read everything that Julia posts on her blog and have done for a very long time. I am here because she is a smart and a good woman, and because I think that it is important that I listen and think about what she has to say. In following her blog, I can hear perspectives that I might not directly encounter in my day to day life.
I chose to comment because I know that Julia is the sort of person whose love for women doesn’t entail a hatred for men, and whose commitment to listen to and believe women doesn’t entail a shutting out and refusal to consider the voices of men. I chose to comment because I have seen over many years of interacting with her that Julia is someone who listens to what I have to say, thinks carefully about it, and responds. I have also seen her willingness to shift her position in response to what I have to say. Much of the time she will disagree with me. However, I respect that disagreement, because I know that it is a thoughtful and considered disagreement, not a reactive and dismissive one.
I commented here because she is the sort of person with whom I can have a conversation that challenges both of us and leaves both of us considering perspectives we might previously not have reflected upon. I respect her deeply for that, as experience has sadly taught me that these traits are very rare in some feminist quarters.
I first came across the word ‘mansplaining’ several years ago, not long after Solnit’s essay that introduced the notion appeared. After encountering the word, I looked for her essay and read it. My reaction to it wasn’t unmixed. I think Solnit’s concept of mansplaining was limited by her lack of exposure to all male contexts. Had she had such exposure, I suspect she would have appreciated something of what Deborah Tannen has spoken of as common but not universal sex differences in conversational styles (men tend to spar with each other and establish a generally playful back-and-forth game of conversational dominance, while women are more likely to focus on empathizing with each other and are less likely to challenge people or force them to fight their corner as men are). Some of the things Solnit experiences as ‘mansplaining’ might, in the context of a male conversation, more likely function the opening gambits in a fun and bonding game of conversational dominance. Neither conversational dynamic is wrong, but we need to be much more considerate of each other.
However, by far my most dominant reaction to the essay was one of recognition. She gave a name to something I had often seen and also done on a number of occasions. Her opening anecdote was truly laugh-out-loud hilarious, but the essay moved into far more serious territory, as it revealed men’s failure to attend to and to trust women’s reporting of their own experiences.
Although I wasn’t prepared to give the sexism dimension quite as much weight as Solnit wanted—the problem, I suspect, is in some measure one of clumsy failure to appreciate and negotiate differences between the sexes—my principal response to the essay was to take two extremely important points more fully on board. 1. I saw how women could find the ‘mansplaining’ that Solnit described deeply annoying and insulting and determined to be more careful and considerate in the future. 2. I saw how the failure to take seriously women’s self-reported experience and knowledge wasn’t just a matter of rudeness in conversations, but could fatally undermine processes of truth and justice in society. Appreciating Solnit’s wit and insight, when her book, Men Explain Things to Me and Other Essays, came out I bought a copy and read it.
Unfortunately, since first coming in contact with Solnit’s argument, I have had the depressing experience of seeing a very helpful and important concept, a concept that helped me come to some awareness of things that I should have recognized before, mangled beyond recognition.
Feminists recognized the power of the concept of mansplaining to name a particular type of engagement that frustrated them. It produced recognition on both sides of a great many conversations. The power of the name and the concept served as a sort of antibiotic by which certain unhealthy conversational dynamics could be effectively treated. Employed with wit and care, women could help men to see that what they were doing wasn’t cool and that, if it became deeply engrained, it could be profoundly dangerous. The great many decent men in society are good people whose behaviour will gradually change as they are shown what is wrong with it. As decent people they feel embarrassment when they recognize that they haven’t been considerate towards others, and this embarrassment leads them to treat problems in their behaviour and ways of thinking.
The problem was that the concept was so effective that many feminists started to use it for every conversational dynamic that frustrated them. When they saw that they could get the upper hand in frustrating conversations and interpersonal interactions by embarrassing decent men for disagreeing with them and problematizing men’s typical behaviour, they started to use it all of the time. ‘Mansplaining’ started to be used, as you have used it here, Samantha, to dismiss and embarrass men who simply dared respectfully to express a different opinion than a woman. It typically had the desired effect: it shut the men up and gave women a sense of righteous superiority.
Seeing the success of the term mansplaining, feminists started to introduce a whole raft of portmanteau words—manspreading, manterrupting, bropropriating, manslamming, etc. Everything that irritated a woman about men’s behaviour was given a term with man- or bro- attached, even when the men’s behaviour wasn’t entirely unreasonable and a little more consideration on the woman’s side would have improved things greatly. This sludge of clumsy neologisms (the French term ‘mecspliquer’ was always the best) swamped conversations and feminists started to use shame and embarrassment to win in every interaction with men. They failed to recognize that what they were doing was akin to using antibiotics when someone gets a scrape on the knee.
Just as overuse of antibiotics to kill bacteria can eventually lead to the production of antibiotic resistant strains and to the increased obsolescence of many antibiotics, so the overuse of shaming on men will produce shame-resistant men and lead to the shaming words and concepts becoming altogether powerless. If you want to understand why America has a President-Elect who is shameless and guilt-free, perhaps you should take a look at yourself. Many people are fed up of the way that people on the social justice left have so overused the antibiotics of political correctness, feminist thought, gender theory, and race theory to shame them, dismiss them, lock them out of the conversation, and stigmatize them. They derive a sort of schadenfreude from seeing the social justice left slowly coming to the realization that their antibiotics of shame aren’t working anymore. People just don’t care.
The more that feminists and social justice activists just dismissed them and their concerns (many of them quite valid), the more that they just stopped listening to, caring about, or taking on board what feminists said. They shut the voice of the feminists out from their conversations. They saw that the antibiotics of shame were being used to protect ideological systems that were without an immune system of their own.
Much contemporary feminist thought wouldn’t be able to survive in the harsh climate of open discourse and argument. Many feminists fail to recognize that by relying upon the antibiotics of shame to deal with external challenges, their thinking never developed a resilience of their own, the sort of resilience that develops when our bodies fight off infections themselves. Exposure to challenge makes you stronger, but feminists have increasingly shielded themselves from challenge. They so often act like fainting Victorian ladies when people disagree with them. They shut down college debate, they no-platformed speakers who disagreed with them, they claimed to be triggered by everything.
Now we are all reaping the consequences. Feminists have things to say that need to be heard. Careful prescription of shame and embarrassment to men who don’t treat women as they ought is very important for society’s health. However, feminists don’t seem to get that they are now viewed as irrelevant by most of the population and that an openly shameless form of male identity is increasingly arising in response to them. They now operate as if in a closed terrarium in their social media bubbles, where fragile and exotic flowers bloom, but where they are no longer deeply and meaningfully engaged with the broader environment. The rest of the world is starting to ignore them, most women refuse to identify with them, and the election of Trump is one symptom of their growing lack of traction in the public conscience. They have used shame, not to help people, but to establish their own cocooned communities of moral superiority.
Thank God for feminists like Julia, who are still prepared to listen to and engage with different opinions and not dismiss them with shame tactics. The fact that I am expressing difference in this comment thread at all is a sign of my respect for her, an indication that I don’t believe that she is a weak, thin skinned, and hyper-emotional woman (like far too many contemporary feminists, to be honest) to be protected from disagreement, but an smart and reasonable interlocutor who is well able to think, engage, reason, persuade, and be persuaded. That I am here is a sign that I haven’t left the room where the feminists are talking and closed the door behind me, leaving them to it.
This openness to argument, if you want to know, is the only way that the feminist movement will have a meaningful future of moral credibility within the wider culture. Even on the left, among the people who are most inclined to listen to the feminists and social justice crowd, there is a huge reaction against and increased dismissal of them (see here for an important rant). You will make a difference when you reject the politics of deference and shaming and once again learn how to listen, how to engage, how to argue, how to persuade. Feminists did it once—and a number still do—so I see no reason why they cannot do so again.
Finally, let me take issue with the accuracy of your use of the term ‘mansplaining’. I don’t think that you know what it means and, in case you think I am being oblivious to some irony in the situation here, let me explicitly point out that a man correcting a woman on the definition of the term ‘mansplaining’ is not the sort of thing that is covered by the concept. Have you read Solnit’s essay? If you haven’t, you should. It is brilliant and perceptive. I have read it, so I know what it says and am in a position to explain it to others. Yes, even to women.
One of the crucial statements that she makes is the following: ‘I love it when people explain things to me they know and I’m interested in but don’t yet know; it’s when they explain things to me I know and they don’t that the conversation goes wrong.’ I highly recommend that you reflect upon the sorts of conversational behaviour that statement challenges and the sorts of conversational behaviour that it doesn’t challenge. Many feminists could do well in following Solnit’s example here in expressing openness to learning from others: yes, even men. They could also benefit from reflecting upon Solnit’s focus in this statement. Note that she doesn’t focus on and fetishize her personal feelings of offence. No, her primary concern is that the conversation goes right. Good for her. We can all learn from that.
Friday, December 09, 2016
Further Thoughts: How Social Justice Ideology Fuels Racism and Sexism
by Alastair Roberts
Alastair's Adversaria
The remarks below follow from the argument of my previous post.
One of the most troubling features of the movement surrounding Trump has been the way in which explicitly and unapologetically racist and sexist voices have moved to the forefront of America’s conversation. The word ‘deplorable’ has been thrown around a lot over the last few months, but this phenomenon truly is deplorable and should openly be declared as such.
However, once again, it is crucial to appreciate the part that social justice and progressive ideology has played in this. In my earlier post, I remarked upon the strange phenomenon that social justice ideologues tend to prefer the notion that perhaps even the majority of the American population is irredeemably sexist and racist to the notion that they might often be well-meaning and intelligent people, with a measure of truth and reasonable concern on their side, people who need to be listened to and reasoned with, rather than merely condemned as hateful and stupid.
The question of why the former belief is the preferred one really needs to be reflected upon. Why are the austere lines of a Manichaean ideology preferred over a social reality that is more tractable to charitable persuasion, forging of common ground, maintenance of relations across ideological divides, and working together despite differences?
I suspect that the reason why has a great deal to do with the fact that it serves the maintenance of the comforting echo chambers of the privileged college students who tend to perpetuate it. Perhaps even more importantly, the Manichaeanism and the accumulation of the complex shibboleths of social justice terminology and ideology all serve to uphold the borders and the moral superiority of an enlightened elite academic, political, and social in-group. The oft-discussed phenomenon of ‘virtue signalling’ refers to the way in which deployment of social justice terminology, policing of other people’s language, expressions of outrage or approval, alignment with or adoption of particular causes, groups, or movements, can all have as its most immediate purpose, not deeply self-invested concrete involvement in ameliorative social action, but the establishment and maintenance of an elite and morally privileged group of enlightened right-thinking people. This phenomenon is especially pronounced in the world of social media.
Manichaean social justice ideology is ideal for the purpose of maintaining the pristine moral superiority of privileged groups on social media. However, most people have to live in the real world, with the very people that have been identified as vicious, evil, and ignorant. Progressives have prioritized their privileged politics of association in their social media cocoons over the politics of the actual relations of vulnerable groups in the real world.
Eavesdropping on social justice oriented groups on social media (Tumblr, blogs like Metafilter, Twitter, etc.), it seems to me that there are very important distinctions to be made between different members of these groups. In particular, there are a lot of very vulnerable and fearful people, who have a great deal of skin in the game. The social justice discourse heightens their sense of being hated and of being radically vulnerable to others who wish to destroy them. They cling to the discourse like fearful clients to a patron.
On the other hand, there are highly privileged people with very little personally invested, who nonetheless derive considerable social advantage from their employment of the discourse as social proof of moral superiority and group membership. There are those on the left who have been pointing out the toxicity of social justice discourse for some time (seriously, read people like Freddie deBoer). The problem here isn’t with the left in general, nor with liberalism in general. Both the left and liberalism have a great deal to offer the world right now. In fact, we need both more than ever. No, the problem is with the social justice ideology of the progressive left in particular.
Of course, hardly anyone in the real world is listening to what goes on in the bubbles of social media in which the progressive left function. Progressive social media is a sort of terrarium, filled with exotic and fragile plants, but sealed off from the wider world, where radically different environmental conditions pertain. Little penetrates into their bubbles from the wider world, and little escapes from them. However, the existence of these bubbles matter immensely because they form the values, associations, minds, and imaginations of the dominant social, political, and cultural classes. This is what occurs in their peer groups and it has become clear that the peer group dynamics of elite progressive liberals powerfully shape the way that they act towards and think of those outside of these peer groups.
It has never been more imperative to recognize that minority groups are used as pawns by the progressive left and weaponized against their ideological and political opponents. When the left is using women, racial minorities, immigrants, and LGBT persons as means to attack straight white Christian men, for instance, it is extremely easy to forget that these groups have never been the enemy. Women are our wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, colleagues, friends. Persons of colour are our neighbours, brothers and sisters in Christ, and family members. Immigrants are people we are knitting into our communities and churches. LGBT persons are our brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, our companions, and our compatriots.
The progressive left operates using the politics of guilt and fear. On the one hand, it exploits a status of moral superiority to incite guilt in lower status groups, who must accept dhimmitude. Men must become emasculated and self-denunciatory, constantly apologizing for the fact of their masculinity. Lower status white people must condemn themselves for representing by their very existence all that is wrong with society. Christians must engage in frequent public expressions of contrition for their faith, its history, and tradition.
On the other hand, it incites and exploits fear in its pet minorities, causing them to cling ever closer to it, to attack its enemies while maintaining their own moral impunity. Its uncompromising liberal ideology must prevail over all, and minorities and vulnerable groups are used to enforce it.
Rather than adopting a gentle approach to navigating the differences between groups, seeking for ways for people with different values and beliefs to live together in peace, progressive liberalism pushes them into the fiercest of opposition. The idea, for instance, that transgender persons, a highly vulnerable group, are best served by imposing an extreme transgender ideology upon the whole population in a merciless manner seems radically misguided. Such an approach may serve the self-idealizing Manichaeanism of elite groups, but it just provokes profound antagonism to transgender persons on the ground. The same is the case with the treatment of bakers, florists, photographers, and registrars who, for reasons of conscience, do not feel able to participate in celebrating gay weddings. Liberal progressivism idealizes the extreme and absolute conflict, not countenancing the possibility that the two groups could coexist happily if only ad hoc arrangements or accommodations were made, if we strengthened the bonds of civil society, and learned how to make space for each other and our differing values. There are a great many LGBT persons who feel exactly the same way as Christians here: we should establish common cause with them against progressive liberalism’s Manichaeanism and collaborate to form strong communities and a robust and hospitable civil society.
The same is true in the discussion about immigration. Liberal progressivism consistently presses to make the immigration debate about white Americans’ hatred of outside groups, refusing to permit a conversation about the justice and prudence of certain radical and unchecked changes to communities and places in which people’s sense of self are powerfully invested.
Liberal progressivism has repeatedly attacked people, not just on account of their actions, ideas, or misplaced values, but on account of what they are. The venomous contempt directed towards ‘men’ or ‘white people’ (of course, coded to refer especially to rural populations) is pure sexism and racism and people often react to it as such. The fact that so few people accept feminism has much to do with its polarizing conspiracy theories, and the ways in which it can often perpetuate itself by practically essentializing a conflict and deep antagonism between the sexes. However, most men and women respect and care for each other enough to resist this framing: they love each other and are deeply invested in each other’s well-being.
When someone like Lena Dunham, so prominent a face of Clinton’s campaign that she was even given control of Clinton’s Instagram account at one point, celebrates the ‘extinction of white men’ it should be clear that Clinton’s campaign will probably be entirely irrelevant to Rust Belt working men concerned about their fate as they face renewed threats of migrating jobs and automation. While those Rust Belt men won’t follow Dunham on Twitter, Dunham’s video illustrates the ideologies of the sort of peer groups at the heart of the Clinton campaign. For such people, a world in which working white men are crushed is often celebrated with a deep schadenfreude, rather than regarded as something to be prevented at all costs for the good of whole communities. They don’t seem to be able to imagine or desire a world in which white men truly thrive and grow to their full stature as persons and members of society. They are so locked in atomizing identity politics that they fail to realize that the interests of working white men are also the interests of their wives, mothers, and daughters (and vice versa). Such ideologies shape policy visions and priorities, which is where the toxic waters of social justice ideology can result in the poisoning of actual communities downstream from the elites’ echo chambers. Or, as happened in the election, those communities will simply turn elsewhere for political patrons.
This racist and sexist social justice ideology has greatly empowered toxic reactionary movements in our national discourse. If white men of a lower social status are expected to adopt a position of cultural dhimmitude before culturally dominant moralizing ideologues, to consent to their cultural and economic obliteration, and to engage in a sort of self-loathing, there will come a time when they start to push back. The power of social justice elites rests heavily upon their supposed moral superiority and their authority in ideologically framing the world of the rest of the population.
As I argued in my previous post, the overreach of progressive liberals, who are chronically out of touch with social and natural reality, has played a prominent part in provoking the rise of a movement that is resistant to shame and guilt, as these had formerly been weaponized to control them. This has taken an especially pronounced form on social media, where a subterranean sewer of racism, misogyny, and hatred has overflowed and its vile contents slop into our conversational thoroughfare.
Once again, it is noteworthy that the leading figures in this are to be found in the abstract bubble of social media, among people who are close to the world of social justice ideology. This movement is one of people deeply ‘street smart’ in the ways of the online world, people who know how to spread hatred through memes and troll humour (most of it is initially provoked less by hatred than by the nihilistic delight of triggering the thin skinned for sport). Trolls don’t function in a vacuum. If you don’t feed them, they die. The trolls of the new racism succeed because they have a vast reservoir of social justice ideology to feed upon near at hand. They derive great pleasure from attacking it and from ridiculing the people who hold it. They purposefully go out of their way to trigger people from a movement that has used triggering as an instrument of ideological control. They have credibility among so many of their peers because they can see that they are attacking incontinent sacred cows. The credibility of the sanctimonious and shrill social justice ideology is utterly destroyed for an increasing number of white men, who have adopted a gleeful nihilism in reaction against it.
People like Milo Yiannopoulos are loved by these young men, not least because, in contrast to the self-flagellation of their social justice believing peers, Milo and his followers are clearly having a great deal of anarchic fun. Milo has credibility with them precisely because he is publicly ridiculing the emperor who has no clothes, directly resisting the social demand that we pretend that movements such as the prevailing form of feminism have deep intellectual integrity and moral authority.
In fact, Milo has public recognition and respect beyond this circle, precisely because he has been one of the leading early voices in exposing the ways in which social justice warriors have asphyxiated public discourse in the university and other fora. Milo goes to a campus, social justice warriors make themselves look like utter fools and lose ever more credibility, their childish tantrums are videoed, shared online, and endlessly remixed for the lulz, and a movement increasingly unchecked by and dismissive of even the many valid concerns within the social justice camp arises. It is essential to recognize that Milo would have no profile whatsoever were it not for the social justice ideologues. The anti-social justice movement has largely been created by the social justice movement. In an ideal world, nihilistic trolls like Milo wouldn’t be in the public conversation. However, in a country of social justice inflicted blindness, the man with one jaundiced eye will become king. Milo was a loud supporter of Donald Trump from early on, calling him ‘Daddy’, and being highly instrumental in the rise of Breitbart as a journalistic organ of the troll right. It is crucially important that we recognize how such forces are created.
The racism of the anti-social justice movement has credibility because so many white men of a lower social status rightly recognize that they have been suppressed by protected lies of social justice ideology. They delight in trolling the sensibilities of social justice ideologues and flaming them, in getting them to react in a way that reveals the impotence of the moral disapprobation that once held them in its thrall. However, this nasty yet seemingly abstract game in the detached world of social media has real world victims as it steadily legitimizes and emboldens some of the most unpleasant elements in society. When the sacred cows of ideology have become so identified with particular racial or minority groups, justifiable attacks on the former can easily be seen to legitimate attacks on the latter.
Against the ugly world created by social justice ideology, we must reject both the politics of guilt on the one side and the politics of fear on the other. We need to learn how to recognize, love, and no longer fear or hate our neighbours. We must turn away from social justice ideology, without dismissing genuine social justice. We must prioritize seeking peace and community in the concrete and real world over the abstract squabbles, status signalling, shibboleths, and group boundary policing. Withdrawn from the abstract context of the absolute and polarizing demands of detached ideologies, it is surprisingly easy by contrast to find common cause and seek a common good with people who differ from us when we relate to them in the concrete world of flesh and blood.
Alastair's Adversaria
The remarks below follow from the argument of my previous post.
One of the most troubling features of the movement surrounding Trump has been the way in which explicitly and unapologetically racist and sexist voices have moved to the forefront of America’s conversation. The word ‘deplorable’ has been thrown around a lot over the last few months, but this phenomenon truly is deplorable and should openly be declared as such.
However, once again, it is crucial to appreciate the part that social justice and progressive ideology has played in this. In my earlier post, I remarked upon the strange phenomenon that social justice ideologues tend to prefer the notion that perhaps even the majority of the American population is irredeemably sexist and racist to the notion that they might often be well-meaning and intelligent people, with a measure of truth and reasonable concern on their side, people who need to be listened to and reasoned with, rather than merely condemned as hateful and stupid.
The question of why the former belief is the preferred one really needs to be reflected upon. Why are the austere lines of a Manichaean ideology preferred over a social reality that is more tractable to charitable persuasion, forging of common ground, maintenance of relations across ideological divides, and working together despite differences?
I suspect that the reason why has a great deal to do with the fact that it serves the maintenance of the comforting echo chambers of the privileged college students who tend to perpetuate it. Perhaps even more importantly, the Manichaeanism and the accumulation of the complex shibboleths of social justice terminology and ideology all serve to uphold the borders and the moral superiority of an enlightened elite academic, political, and social in-group. The oft-discussed phenomenon of ‘virtue signalling’ refers to the way in which deployment of social justice terminology, policing of other people’s language, expressions of outrage or approval, alignment with or adoption of particular causes, groups, or movements, can all have as its most immediate purpose, not deeply self-invested concrete involvement in ameliorative social action, but the establishment and maintenance of an elite and morally privileged group of enlightened right-thinking people. This phenomenon is especially pronounced in the world of social media.
Manichaean social justice ideology is ideal for the purpose of maintaining the pristine moral superiority of privileged groups on social media. However, most people have to live in the real world, with the very people that have been identified as vicious, evil, and ignorant. Progressives have prioritized their privileged politics of association in their social media cocoons over the politics of the actual relations of vulnerable groups in the real world.
Eavesdropping on social justice oriented groups on social media (Tumblr, blogs like Metafilter, Twitter, etc.), it seems to me that there are very important distinctions to be made between different members of these groups. In particular, there are a lot of very vulnerable and fearful people, who have a great deal of skin in the game. The social justice discourse heightens their sense of being hated and of being radically vulnerable to others who wish to destroy them. They cling to the discourse like fearful clients to a patron.
On the other hand, there are highly privileged people with very little personally invested, who nonetheless derive considerable social advantage from their employment of the discourse as social proof of moral superiority and group membership. There are those on the left who have been pointing out the toxicity of social justice discourse for some time (seriously, read people like Freddie deBoer). The problem here isn’t with the left in general, nor with liberalism in general. Both the left and liberalism have a great deal to offer the world right now. In fact, we need both more than ever. No, the problem is with the social justice ideology of the progressive left in particular.
Of course, hardly anyone in the real world is listening to what goes on in the bubbles of social media in which the progressive left function. Progressive social media is a sort of terrarium, filled with exotic and fragile plants, but sealed off from the wider world, where radically different environmental conditions pertain. Little penetrates into their bubbles from the wider world, and little escapes from them. However, the existence of these bubbles matter immensely because they form the values, associations, minds, and imaginations of the dominant social, political, and cultural classes. This is what occurs in their peer groups and it has become clear that the peer group dynamics of elite progressive liberals powerfully shape the way that they act towards and think of those outside of these peer groups.
It has never been more imperative to recognize that minority groups are used as pawns by the progressive left and weaponized against their ideological and political opponents. When the left is using women, racial minorities, immigrants, and LGBT persons as means to attack straight white Christian men, for instance, it is extremely easy to forget that these groups have never been the enemy. Women are our wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, colleagues, friends. Persons of colour are our neighbours, brothers and sisters in Christ, and family members. Immigrants are people we are knitting into our communities and churches. LGBT persons are our brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, our companions, and our compatriots.
The progressive left operates using the politics of guilt and fear. On the one hand, it exploits a status of moral superiority to incite guilt in lower status groups, who must accept dhimmitude. Men must become emasculated and self-denunciatory, constantly apologizing for the fact of their masculinity. Lower status white people must condemn themselves for representing by their very existence all that is wrong with society. Christians must engage in frequent public expressions of contrition for their faith, its history, and tradition.
On the other hand, it incites and exploits fear in its pet minorities, causing them to cling ever closer to it, to attack its enemies while maintaining their own moral impunity. Its uncompromising liberal ideology must prevail over all, and minorities and vulnerable groups are used to enforce it.
Rather than adopting a gentle approach to navigating the differences between groups, seeking for ways for people with different values and beliefs to live together in peace, progressive liberalism pushes them into the fiercest of opposition. The idea, for instance, that transgender persons, a highly vulnerable group, are best served by imposing an extreme transgender ideology upon the whole population in a merciless manner seems radically misguided. Such an approach may serve the self-idealizing Manichaeanism of elite groups, but it just provokes profound antagonism to transgender persons on the ground. The same is the case with the treatment of bakers, florists, photographers, and registrars who, for reasons of conscience, do not feel able to participate in celebrating gay weddings. Liberal progressivism idealizes the extreme and absolute conflict, not countenancing the possibility that the two groups could coexist happily if only ad hoc arrangements or accommodations were made, if we strengthened the bonds of civil society, and learned how to make space for each other and our differing values. There are a great many LGBT persons who feel exactly the same way as Christians here: we should establish common cause with them against progressive liberalism’s Manichaeanism and collaborate to form strong communities and a robust and hospitable civil society.
The same is true in the discussion about immigration. Liberal progressivism consistently presses to make the immigration debate about white Americans’ hatred of outside groups, refusing to permit a conversation about the justice and prudence of certain radical and unchecked changes to communities and places in which people’s sense of self are powerfully invested.
Liberal progressivism has repeatedly attacked people, not just on account of their actions, ideas, or misplaced values, but on account of what they are. The venomous contempt directed towards ‘men’ or ‘white people’ (of course, coded to refer especially to rural populations) is pure sexism and racism and people often react to it as such. The fact that so few people accept feminism has much to do with its polarizing conspiracy theories, and the ways in which it can often perpetuate itself by practically essentializing a conflict and deep antagonism between the sexes. However, most men and women respect and care for each other enough to resist this framing: they love each other and are deeply invested in each other’s well-being.
When someone like Lena Dunham, so prominent a face of Clinton’s campaign that she was even given control of Clinton’s Instagram account at one point, celebrates the ‘extinction of white men’ it should be clear that Clinton’s campaign will probably be entirely irrelevant to Rust Belt working men concerned about their fate as they face renewed threats of migrating jobs and automation. While those Rust Belt men won’t follow Dunham on Twitter, Dunham’s video illustrates the ideologies of the sort of peer groups at the heart of the Clinton campaign. For such people, a world in which working white men are crushed is often celebrated with a deep schadenfreude, rather than regarded as something to be prevented at all costs for the good of whole communities. They don’t seem to be able to imagine or desire a world in which white men truly thrive and grow to their full stature as persons and members of society. They are so locked in atomizing identity politics that they fail to realize that the interests of working white men are also the interests of their wives, mothers, and daughters (and vice versa). Such ideologies shape policy visions and priorities, which is where the toxic waters of social justice ideology can result in the poisoning of actual communities downstream from the elites’ echo chambers. Or, as happened in the election, those communities will simply turn elsewhere for political patrons.
This racist and sexist social justice ideology has greatly empowered toxic reactionary movements in our national discourse. If white men of a lower social status are expected to adopt a position of cultural dhimmitude before culturally dominant moralizing ideologues, to consent to their cultural and economic obliteration, and to engage in a sort of self-loathing, there will come a time when they start to push back. The power of social justice elites rests heavily upon their supposed moral superiority and their authority in ideologically framing the world of the rest of the population.
As I argued in my previous post, the overreach of progressive liberals, who are chronically out of touch with social and natural reality, has played a prominent part in provoking the rise of a movement that is resistant to shame and guilt, as these had formerly been weaponized to control them. This has taken an especially pronounced form on social media, where a subterranean sewer of racism, misogyny, and hatred has overflowed and its vile contents slop into our conversational thoroughfare.
Once again, it is noteworthy that the leading figures in this are to be found in the abstract bubble of social media, among people who are close to the world of social justice ideology. This movement is one of people deeply ‘street smart’ in the ways of the online world, people who know how to spread hatred through memes and troll humour (most of it is initially provoked less by hatred than by the nihilistic delight of triggering the thin skinned for sport). Trolls don’t function in a vacuum. If you don’t feed them, they die. The trolls of the new racism succeed because they have a vast reservoir of social justice ideology to feed upon near at hand. They derive great pleasure from attacking it and from ridiculing the people who hold it. They purposefully go out of their way to trigger people from a movement that has used triggering as an instrument of ideological control. They have credibility among so many of their peers because they can see that they are attacking incontinent sacred cows. The credibility of the sanctimonious and shrill social justice ideology is utterly destroyed for an increasing number of white men, who have adopted a gleeful nihilism in reaction against it.
People like Milo Yiannopoulos are loved by these young men, not least because, in contrast to the self-flagellation of their social justice believing peers, Milo and his followers are clearly having a great deal of anarchic fun. Milo has credibility with them precisely because he is publicly ridiculing the emperor who has no clothes, directly resisting the social demand that we pretend that movements such as the prevailing form of feminism have deep intellectual integrity and moral authority.
In fact, Milo has public recognition and respect beyond this circle, precisely because he has been one of the leading early voices in exposing the ways in which social justice warriors have asphyxiated public discourse in the university and other fora. Milo goes to a campus, social justice warriors make themselves look like utter fools and lose ever more credibility, their childish tantrums are videoed, shared online, and endlessly remixed for the lulz, and a movement increasingly unchecked by and dismissive of even the many valid concerns within the social justice camp arises. It is essential to recognize that Milo would have no profile whatsoever were it not for the social justice ideologues. The anti-social justice movement has largely been created by the social justice movement. In an ideal world, nihilistic trolls like Milo wouldn’t be in the public conversation. However, in a country of social justice inflicted blindness, the man with one jaundiced eye will become king. Milo was a loud supporter of Donald Trump from early on, calling him ‘Daddy’, and being highly instrumental in the rise of Breitbart as a journalistic organ of the troll right. It is crucially important that we recognize how such forces are created.
The racism of the anti-social justice movement has credibility because so many white men of a lower social status rightly recognize that they have been suppressed by protected lies of social justice ideology. They delight in trolling the sensibilities of social justice ideologues and flaming them, in getting them to react in a way that reveals the impotence of the moral disapprobation that once held them in its thrall. However, this nasty yet seemingly abstract game in the detached world of social media has real world victims as it steadily legitimizes and emboldens some of the most unpleasant elements in society. When the sacred cows of ideology have become so identified with particular racial or minority groups, justifiable attacks on the former can easily be seen to legitimate attacks on the latter.
Against the ugly world created by social justice ideology, we must reject both the politics of guilt on the one side and the politics of fear on the other. We need to learn how to recognize, love, and no longer fear or hate our neighbours. We must turn away from social justice ideology, without dismissing genuine social justice. We must prioritize seeking peace and community in the concrete and real world over the abstract squabbles, status signalling, shibboleths, and group boundary policing. Withdrawn from the abstract context of the absolute and polarizing demands of detached ideologies, it is surprisingly easy by contrast to find common cause and seek a common good with people who differ from us when we relate to them in the concrete world of flesh and blood.
Culture and the Light of Faith: How Christianity embraced and transformed Classical culture
by Robert Louis Wilken
First Things
Since the Enlightenment it has been fashionable to denounce Christians for prostituting the legacy of classical culture. Edward Gibbon wrote that Christians had “debased and vitiated the faculties of the mind” and “extinguished the hostile light of philosophy and science” that had shone brightly in the ancient world. Gilbert Murray, a classicist of the early twentieth century, echoed Gibbon: “Truth was finally made hopeless,” he wrote, “when the world, mistrusting Reason, wary of arguments and wonder, flung itself passionately under the spell of a system of authoritative Revelation, which acknowledged no truth outside itself and stamped free inquiry as sin.” Murray mourned the consequences: “The intellect of Greece died ultimately of that long discouragement which works upon nations like slow poison.”
It is ironic that the intellectual hubris of these judgments (which in a moment of generosity might be called intemperate) would have been impossible without access to Greek and Latin sources prior to Christianity. When Christianity became ascendant in the early Middle Ages, the books of the Greeks and Romans were copied and transmitted to later generations, thereby preserving the wisdom and learning of antique culture largely intact and providing the very basis on which Gibbon, Murray, and others formulated their attacks on Christendom.
In some civilizations the relation between religion and culture is so intimate that it is impossible to disentangle the one from the other, or to trace the separate sources that gave rise to distinctive forms of social and spiritual life. Christianity, however, does not fit comfortably into this pattern. Even though many different streams flowed into the great river that is Christian history, some of the sources that gave rise to Christian culture were already mighty torrents before they became part of the new civilization. In his provocative book Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization (2009), RĂ©mi Brague calls this dependency on an earlier culture secondarity. By this term he means not simply that an earlier culture is given as a historical fact, but that those who come later honor and cherish what went before.
Secondarity was evident among the ancient Romans who received and admired the cultural accomplishments of the Greeks and made them their own. But secondarity was no less a characteristic of the early Christians. When they first began to adorn the walls of the catacombs with pictures, they drew freely on the artistic traditions of the ancient world. They appropriated, for example, two familiar images from Greco-Roman culture: the kriophoros, or lamb bearer (what appears to us as the good shepherd), which represented philanthropia; and the orant, a figure with hands uplifted in a gesture of prayer that symbolized piety.
In other paintings artists depicted people and events that are recognizably biblical, such as the figure of Jonah, but the visual vocabulary was taken from Roman art. The painter, whether a Christian or a skilled pagan hired for the task, did not draw the figure of Jonah cold, with merely the text of the Bible before him. He exploited a repertory of stock models that were known to Roman artists. The image of Jonah under the broom tree is a Christian version of the familiar figure of Endymion, a handsome young man with whom the goddess Selene fell in love. In Greek art Endymion was depicted sleeping in a cave, where he was visited periodically by his lover. Christians adopted the image of the sleeping Endymion to depict Jonah, painting it on the walls of catacombs and carving it on Christian sarcophagi.
Another figure familiar in early Christian art is the Greek singer Orpheus with his lyre. He is clothed in a short tunic, wears a Phrygian cap, and is surrounded by wild beasts. In Greek myth Orpheus had a voice of such sweetness that no one could resist his melodies. He met and wooed the young maiden Eurydice, but their joy was brief. Shortly after they were married, she died from a serpent’s bite. Determined to free his beloved from the land of the dead, Orpheus went down into Hades and so charmed the netherworld with his singing that he won her release, but on the condition that as he led her to the land of the living, he would not look back at her. At the very end of the journey, he turned to see whether Eurydice was behind him—and lost her forever. He then forsook the company of human beings and retired to the woods near his home in Thrace, in northern Greece, where his mournful song enchanted the trees and rivers and tamed the wild animals.
Although Christian writers seldom drew on ancient myths to interpret the person of Christ, one Christian writer, Clement of Alexandria, thought the parallel between Orpheus and Christ was fitting. Orpheus, a skilled master of his art, pacified wild beasts by the power of his song, but Christ’s new song, says Clement, is able to tame “the most intractable of all animals—man.”
A different kind of example of secondarity is the Christian reception of Roman law. When, in the sixth century, the Christian emperor Justinian undertook a revision of Roman law, he had his legal scholars collect statutes going back to the time of Hadrian, a pagan emperor, in the second century. Justinian’s lawyers recognized that law has its own integrity and independence, and the influence of Christian beliefs and ideas on the Corpus Iuris Civilis is slight. There is little evidence of a systematic effort to Christianize the substantive principles of classical Roman law. Much later, at Bologna in the Middle Ages, Christian legal scholars based their work on Roman law, the legal system of an earlier civilization.
Secondarity is not characteristic of all Christian cultures. When Christianity arrived in Armenia in the fourth century, there was no written culture. Armenian “literature” was made up of heroic oral epics. Christianity could not exist without books, and, after some experimentation with different alphabets, the resourceful and enterprising monk Mastoc created, with heavenly inspiration and the skills of a calligrapher, a body of letters that suited the Armenian language. At once he put several of his students to the task of translating the Bible into Armenian, beginning, curiously, with the Book of Proverbs. Latin-speaking Christians in North Africa learned their letters reading Virgil or Horace; Armenian Christians learned theirs reading the Bible. As a consequence Armenian culture was Christian culture, with no prior tradition to build on or play off against that of the Church. In like manner, in the ninth century, when the apostles to the Slavs, Cyril and Methodius, devised an alphabet to write down the Slavic language, they laid the foundation for a Slavic Christian culture.
In the West, however, secondarity has been the rule. And although preserving what had come before made Christianity vulnerable to critique from within, drawing inspiration from the ancient books it used and cherished also provided the Church with intellectual resources to create a new civilization that drew on the wealth of the old—the “spoils of Egypt,” as Origen of Alexandria called the appropriation of Greek wisdom. Christianity was born in a world with a mature and fully developed culture, an established educational system, a canon of literary classics, sophisticated philosophical traditions, a coherent understanding of the moral life, an inheritance of art and architecture, and law and politics. It is a remarkable experience, one that never fails to astonish, to visit the ruins of the Roman Empire that can be found all over the Mediterranean world. From Tunisia in the west to Syria in the east, from Italy on the north shore to Libya on the south, in Turkey and the Balkans, in France and in Spain, one finds the remains of cities whose beauty and grace and grandeur fill the observer with awe and wonder.
Not only are some of the buildings still standing (the theater at Ephesus is a spectacular example), but the books—among them the Aeneid of Virgil and the Lives of Plutarch—written by the inhabitants of these cities and the languages they used—Latin and Greek—still terrorize adolescents and delight their teachers. Under the British Empire, men who as youths had their minds stuffed with Greek and Latin conjugations ruled large regions of the world. Whether early Christians spoke Latin or Greek, lived in Alexandria in Egypt or Carthage in North Africa (present day Tunisia), they were formed by Greek or Latin literature.
How Augustine loved Virgil—the “renowned poet,” as he called him. As a student Augustine wept over the death of Dido, the Punic queen who took her own life out of love. Learned Christians read Plato’s Timaeus before Genesis and Thucydides before the Acts of the Apostles. Clement of Alexandria, a Greek Christian writer who flourished about the year A.D. 200, effortlessly cited hundreds of passages from Greek poets, philosophers, playwrights, and historians in his writings. To this day he is an unparalleled source of classical citations from lost works, including many precious passages from the writings of pre-Socratic philosophers.
Clement’s writings, like those of other Christian authors in the earlier centuries, were didactic in the broad sense of that term. They were written to instruct and edify, to explain and defend. They would not have been called “literature,” that is, works of the imagination to be read for pleasure at one’s leisure. The first Christian to compose genuine literary works was Aurelius Prudentius Clemens, who was born into a Christian family in Roman Hispania (present-day Spain), in the northeast province of Tarraconensis, in A.D. 348. As a child of the provincial aristocracy, he received a traditional education, which meant he studied Latin grammar, rhetoric, and, finally, law. When his studies were completed, he pursued a conventional career as an advocate and then was offered a position in the civil administration. What sets Prudentius apart is that he saw himself as a poet by profession. He was not a bishop but a layman with a vocation as poet. In his words, “If I cannot give praise to God by my works, let my soul praise God with my voice.”
Prudentius wrote his poems to be read aloud in a living room or salon or used as a basis for reflection in the solitude of one’s study. Two works in particular stand out. The first is Peristephanon, Crown of Martyrdom, a highly original collection of fourteen poems on martyrs. With these poems Prudentius was forging a Christian past—a historical memory for the emerging Christian culture. Besides the great heroes of faith in the Scriptures, Christianity could celebrate “the noble army of martyrs,” as the Te Deum has it. Crown of Martyrdom includes poems on martyrs from Spain and the city of Rome, on Peter and Paul, on St. Agnes and St. Laurence, even on a soldier named Quirinius.
Prudentius also wrote the first Christian epic—a long, allegorical poem called Psychomachia (spiritual warfare), about the internal struggle that takes place in every human soul visited by grace.
Every poet depends on readers who can appreciate and enjoy form as well as content, and his poetry would not have been possible had there not been a long tradition of Latin poetry before the rise of Christianity. Prudentius’ models were not the Psalms or the “canticles” in the Scriptures but the classical Latin poets, and his readers took delight in his metrical virtuosity and verbal allusions to Virgil or Ovid or Horace. One small tribute to his greatness is that, in a library in Gaul, a few generations after his death, his works were kept on a shelf alongside those of Horace. Medieval Latin readers loved his poetry—the Psychomachia was copied over and over—because Prudentius successfully used traditional forms to express a Christian vision.
Prudentius wrote at a time when the foundations were being laid for a new Christian civilization. Like the architects who set about designing churches for the new Christian society and the artists who took up the challenge of depicting Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints in paint and mosaic, gold and stone, Prudentius put language at the service of the new civilization: He offered his words as a vehicle for the Word. In doing so, he consciously sought to redefine the beautiful by referring to Christ while building on the foundation of the old. Through the luxuriance of his language and the facility of his meter, he achieved a richness of form beyond the reach of earlier Christian writers and a freshness of spirit long forgotten by Latin poets. His work is at once deeply Christian and indisputably musical, and he set Christian tradition on a course that, centuries later, gave rise to a poet as enchanting as Edmund Spenser.
In Prudentius’ day the Latin culture of the Roman world was still intact, and a learned public could appreciate his complicated meter and wordplay. But a time was coming when the cultured society Prudentius could take for granted would go into decline and almost disappear. In that new time, no longer was the Church faced with the task of transforming what had been received; now, its vocation was to preserve and hand on what was being forgotten. People had to be taught to read and write and speak Latin correctly. Consequently, some prescient Christian thinkers turned their attention to grammar, which Dante called la prima arte. As with Prudentius, the intellectual inheritance of the ancients is evident in the grammarians’ writings, but in a quite different way.
Among early medieval writers who devoted their literary efforts to grammar, the Spaniard Isidore, bishop of Seville, stands out. By the time Isidore was born, in 560, the Roman Empire in the West had long since collapsed. The territories once under its dominion—Italy, Gaul, and Spain—were ruled by Germanic kings. Born into the landed gentry of Cartagena, Isidore was educated at an episcopal school in Seville under the supervision of his brother Leander, the bishop of the city. In the year 600 Isidore succeeded Leander as bishop. Isidore had a profound influence on the Spanish church, its liturgy, its laws, and its relation to the Visigothic kings. But he commands our attention because of his interest in language and in organizing the knowledge that had been inherited from the past.
The work that best represents his genius is known as the Etymologies. It is a vast encyclopedia that attempted to summarize all branches of knowledge by drawing on the vast reservoir of classical writers: Aesop, Apuleius, Aristotle, Julius Caesar, Catullus, Cicero, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Hesiod, Homer, Horace, Juvenal, Livy, Lucretius, Ovid, Pindar, Plato, Plautus, Quintilian, and Virgil.
The Etymologies deals with grammar, rhetoric, mathematics, medicine, law, ecclesiastical books and offices, languages, kingdoms, human beings, animals, weights and measures, agriculture, ships, architecture, and clothes. Isidore was engaged in an enterprise not unlike that of my former colleague at the University of Virginia, Eric Hirsch. Hirsch showed that to engage in such an apparently simple task as reading a book or newspaper, one must know certain things. He published a Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, full of lists of the meanings of words and things and places and persons, and a series of books entitled What Your Fifth Grader Has to Know.
Isidore also wrote a work entitled Liber differentiarum sive de proprietate sermonum, a book on the precise meaning of words–that is, the distinctions one must make to use them correctly. One example is the difference between aptum and utile: the first refers to something that is temporal, that is, for a time; the second refers to an enduring condition. Similarly, with alterum and alius, the first refers to the other of two and the second, to other among many. Comparing audire and exaudire, the one means to hear, the other, to listen. Sanguis and cruor are two words for blood. One refers to blood as lifeblood; the other, to the blood that flows from a wound. The list is not unlike what one finds in Fowler’s Modern English Usage: the differences between sensuous and sensual, fewer and lesser, further and farther, depreciate and deprecate, as and like.
The pedantic grammarian serves as a standard comic figure, but civilization is a thin and fragile thing, and respect for language cannot be taken for granted. Just as stewards of English need to work overtime in our society, so in the sixth century, when spoken Latin was developing into the Romance languages, early medieval thinkers learned that they had to be diligent about grammar, spelling, correct use of terms, and the like.
Isidore, like the famous Roman grammarian and rhetorician Quintilian, recognized that grammar is “the science of correct speech and the interpretation of the poets.” It is not simply a matter of knowing which case goes with which preposition or when to use the subjunctive; it is a study of the features of language and the rules that govern the relation of words and concepts. Grammar teaches students to make distinctions and to use words accurately; it introduces concepts such as analogy and explains the different figures of speech. For Isidore grammar also included etymology: “If you know the origin of a word, you more quickly understand its force. Everything can be more clearly comprehended when its etymology is known.”
Isidore’s work was intended to serve copyists and to make possible the reading of the Bible. But by taking responsibility for elementary education, he also encouraged clear and cogent thinking; this, in turn, lent solidity, authority, and elegance to writing. For Isidore grammar and lexicography were instruments of culture. Indeed, to produce the kind of works he did, drawing on examples from ancient literature, especially in the conditions of his time, required uncommon perseverance and discipline and a well-organized scriptorium for copying earlier books.
Christianity cannot send down deep roots, be handed on from one generation to the next, or flourish without language. Reason is unthinkable without language—a truth that was seen with great perspicacity by J.G. Hamann, the critic of the Enlightenment. “Language is the mother of reason and its revelations, its Alpha and Omega,” he wrote. That our words should follow rules handed down by authorities who are themselves servants of past masters of language provides a fitting preparation for the ordering of common life according to divine commandments handed down from the apostolic tradition.
In the second century Tertullian, the first Christian to write in Latin, already recognized the intimate relation between faith and language. In his day the Latin language and literature were wedded to the gods of Rome. One could not teach Virgil’s Aeneid without introducing students to the Roman gods. As Tertullian put it, in Roman society literature has an affinity with idolatry. For many this alliance offered a vehicle to upbraid Christians: If they cannot teach literature because its content runs against their beliefs, let them remain unlearned. But, responded Tertullian, learning one’s letters is essential for human life. Christians cannot repudiate secular learning; without language divine learning is ephemeral.
Often, the relation between Christianity and classical culture focuses on the great issues of philosophy. As important as metaphysics might be, Prudentius and Isidore display subtle ways in which Catholic culture draws its moisture from the river of antique culture. Prudentius assumes that the language and forms of Latin poetry can be adapted to the Christian mysteries and create poetry as elegant and refined as that of the great Latin poets. Facing a different challenge, Isidore of Seville returns to basics, not only providing a reservoir of knowledge for the medieval world but also molding the linguistic and conceptual categories that shape literary and intellectual life. And, lest the point be forgotten, this priceless inheritance is the work of a Catholic bishop.
At the University of Virginia, in old Cabell Hall—an auditorium used for classical concerts—a large picture, about forty feet in width and perhaps thirty feet high, dominates the stage. Wherever one sits in the auditorium, there is a good view of the picture; during a concert one can view it throughout the evening. The painting is a copy of Raphael’s School of Athens, a work created for the papal apartments in Rome in 1510–1511, when the artist was in his late twenties. It shows a large Renaissance portico with a magnificent barrel ceiling that opens into a spacious hall. In the center, at the top of a few steps, stand Plato and Aristotle, Plato apparently holding the Timaeus, and Aristotle gripping his Ethics. Around them on either side are the intellectual giants of ancient Greece—Ptolemy, Archimedes, Euclid, Diogenes, Epicurus, Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and others. The painting represents the major intellectual disciplines, and it was placed in Cabell Hall to reflect the high ideals to which the university aspires.
Standing alone, the School of Athens expresses the confidence and self-sufficiency of man to know the truth through his own intellectual efforts. Although Cabell Hall was built long after the death of Thomas Jefferson, Raphael’s painting is a fitting monument to the ideals of the Enlightenment. All that society needs, the painting suggests, can be found in ancient Athens.
But many who sit in Cabell Hall and contemplate the School of Athens do not realize, unless they have been to Rome to visit the Stanze di Raffaello, that Raphael painted two pictures that face each other across a modest-sized room. The title of the second picture is sometimes given as the Disputa, or the Disputation over the Sacrament , but it is more appropriately entitled the Adoration of the Sacrament. In the center sits a large monstrance on an altar, with an exposed host of the Eucharist. Above, in ascending order, are the dove of the Holy Spirit, Christ, and, at the apex, God the Father.
In this painting, as in the School of Athens, most of the figures are identifiable: the four Latin doctors of the Church—Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory the Great; medieval teachers Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure; spiritual leaders Dominic and Francis; artists Fra Angelico and Bramante; and the poet Dante. Flanking Christ are the Virgin Mary and John the Baptist; around them one sees Abraham, Moses, David, Jeremiah, Peter and Paul, John the Evangelist, and other biblical saints. The School of Athens is laid out on a horizontal axis, with its several groups extending like an animated frieze across the width of the picture. The Disputa, however, is arranged on a vertical as well as a horizontal axis, and the two axes converge on the host. The world below and the world above communicate with each other, and the entire scene is crowned by a golden light that streams from above.
I had known of Rafael’s Disputa, but it was not until I visited the Stanze di Raffaello and saw the two paintings facing each other that I realized why I had always been dissatisfied with the reproduction of the School of Athens in Cabell Hall. As beautiful and uplifting as it is, taken by itself it is partial and limiting, closed off to the light from above. It offers a frail foundation for a true humanism. “Reason,” wrote Dante, “even when supported by the senses, has short wings.” Raphael’s Disputa lifts our minds toward things that cannot be seen while putting before us those who, in the words of the Book of Wisdom, obtained “friendship with God” and were “commended for the gifts that come from instruction.”
What is missing from the School of Athens is not only the light from above, but also men and women of faith, like Prudentius and Isidore, who pursued the arts and sciences because they were believers. They had confidence they could know human things because they had seen divine things. In an individual believer, faith can exist without reason. God does not measure out the supernatural gifts of grace according to IQ. Yet, as a community, the Church needs reason to give faith cultural heft and the density of varied expression in language, whether it be the disciplined, imaginative reasoning that poetry requires, or the elementary, conceptual reasoning of grammar. Reason, for its part, needs faith because the natural powers of the human intellect easily lose sight of their goal, which is the fullness of truth, and can become susceptible to various forms of authoritarianism and intolerance.
The two paintings are complementary and together are a fitting monument to the relation between Christianity and classical culture. Raphael was not a creature of the Enlightenment, pitting reason against faith. He intuitively expressed the “secondarity” of Christian culture, treating the world symbolized by the School of Athens as a part of the Church’s patrimony, working in tandem with its doctrine that the one God is known as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—as St. Paul taught in front of the Areopagus, quoting from a poet of Athens to draw his listeners toward the truths of faith.
Athens and Jerusalem belong together. Christian culture is never solely religious; it embraces what is best in thought, literature, art, and the sciences—a truth St. Paul saw at the very beginning of the Church’s history. In the Letter to the Philippians he wrote, “Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think on these things.” And so we must and do.
Robert Louis Wilken, chairman of the board of the Institute on Religion and Public Life, is the William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of the History of Christianity Emeritus at the University of Virginia.
First Things
Since the Enlightenment it has been fashionable to denounce Christians for prostituting the legacy of classical culture. Edward Gibbon wrote that Christians had “debased and vitiated the faculties of the mind” and “extinguished the hostile light of philosophy and science” that had shone brightly in the ancient world. Gilbert Murray, a classicist of the early twentieth century, echoed Gibbon: “Truth was finally made hopeless,” he wrote, “when the world, mistrusting Reason, wary of arguments and wonder, flung itself passionately under the spell of a system of authoritative Revelation, which acknowledged no truth outside itself and stamped free inquiry as sin.” Murray mourned the consequences: “The intellect of Greece died ultimately of that long discouragement which works upon nations like slow poison.”
It is ironic that the intellectual hubris of these judgments (which in a moment of generosity might be called intemperate) would have been impossible without access to Greek and Latin sources prior to Christianity. When Christianity became ascendant in the early Middle Ages, the books of the Greeks and Romans were copied and transmitted to later generations, thereby preserving the wisdom and learning of antique culture largely intact and providing the very basis on which Gibbon, Murray, and others formulated their attacks on Christendom.
In some civilizations the relation between religion and culture is so intimate that it is impossible to disentangle the one from the other, or to trace the separate sources that gave rise to distinctive forms of social and spiritual life. Christianity, however, does not fit comfortably into this pattern. Even though many different streams flowed into the great river that is Christian history, some of the sources that gave rise to Christian culture were already mighty torrents before they became part of the new civilization. In his provocative book Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization (2009), RĂ©mi Brague calls this dependency on an earlier culture secondarity. By this term he means not simply that an earlier culture is given as a historical fact, but that those who come later honor and cherish what went before.
Secondarity was evident among the ancient Romans who received and admired the cultural accomplishments of the Greeks and made them their own. But secondarity was no less a characteristic of the early Christians. When they first began to adorn the walls of the catacombs with pictures, they drew freely on the artistic traditions of the ancient world. They appropriated, for example, two familiar images from Greco-Roman culture: the kriophoros, or lamb bearer (what appears to us as the good shepherd), which represented philanthropia; and the orant, a figure with hands uplifted in a gesture of prayer that symbolized piety.
In other paintings artists depicted people and events that are recognizably biblical, such as the figure of Jonah, but the visual vocabulary was taken from Roman art. The painter, whether a Christian or a skilled pagan hired for the task, did not draw the figure of Jonah cold, with merely the text of the Bible before him. He exploited a repertory of stock models that were known to Roman artists. The image of Jonah under the broom tree is a Christian version of the familiar figure of Endymion, a handsome young man with whom the goddess Selene fell in love. In Greek art Endymion was depicted sleeping in a cave, where he was visited periodically by his lover. Christians adopted the image of the sleeping Endymion to depict Jonah, painting it on the walls of catacombs and carving it on Christian sarcophagi.
Another figure familiar in early Christian art is the Greek singer Orpheus with his lyre. He is clothed in a short tunic, wears a Phrygian cap, and is surrounded by wild beasts. In Greek myth Orpheus had a voice of such sweetness that no one could resist his melodies. He met and wooed the young maiden Eurydice, but their joy was brief. Shortly after they were married, she died from a serpent’s bite. Determined to free his beloved from the land of the dead, Orpheus went down into Hades and so charmed the netherworld with his singing that he won her release, but on the condition that as he led her to the land of the living, he would not look back at her. At the very end of the journey, he turned to see whether Eurydice was behind him—and lost her forever. He then forsook the company of human beings and retired to the woods near his home in Thrace, in northern Greece, where his mournful song enchanted the trees and rivers and tamed the wild animals.
Although Christian writers seldom drew on ancient myths to interpret the person of Christ, one Christian writer, Clement of Alexandria, thought the parallel between Orpheus and Christ was fitting. Orpheus, a skilled master of his art, pacified wild beasts by the power of his song, but Christ’s new song, says Clement, is able to tame “the most intractable of all animals—man.”
A different kind of example of secondarity is the Christian reception of Roman law. When, in the sixth century, the Christian emperor Justinian undertook a revision of Roman law, he had his legal scholars collect statutes going back to the time of Hadrian, a pagan emperor, in the second century. Justinian’s lawyers recognized that law has its own integrity and independence, and the influence of Christian beliefs and ideas on the Corpus Iuris Civilis is slight. There is little evidence of a systematic effort to Christianize the substantive principles of classical Roman law. Much later, at Bologna in the Middle Ages, Christian legal scholars based their work on Roman law, the legal system of an earlier civilization.
Secondarity is not characteristic of all Christian cultures. When Christianity arrived in Armenia in the fourth century, there was no written culture. Armenian “literature” was made up of heroic oral epics. Christianity could not exist without books, and, after some experimentation with different alphabets, the resourceful and enterprising monk Mastoc created, with heavenly inspiration and the skills of a calligrapher, a body of letters that suited the Armenian language. At once he put several of his students to the task of translating the Bible into Armenian, beginning, curiously, with the Book of Proverbs. Latin-speaking Christians in North Africa learned their letters reading Virgil or Horace; Armenian Christians learned theirs reading the Bible. As a consequence Armenian culture was Christian culture, with no prior tradition to build on or play off against that of the Church. In like manner, in the ninth century, when the apostles to the Slavs, Cyril and Methodius, devised an alphabet to write down the Slavic language, they laid the foundation for a Slavic Christian culture.
In the West, however, secondarity has been the rule. And although preserving what had come before made Christianity vulnerable to critique from within, drawing inspiration from the ancient books it used and cherished also provided the Church with intellectual resources to create a new civilization that drew on the wealth of the old—the “spoils of Egypt,” as Origen of Alexandria called the appropriation of Greek wisdom. Christianity was born in a world with a mature and fully developed culture, an established educational system, a canon of literary classics, sophisticated philosophical traditions, a coherent understanding of the moral life, an inheritance of art and architecture, and law and politics. It is a remarkable experience, one that never fails to astonish, to visit the ruins of the Roman Empire that can be found all over the Mediterranean world. From Tunisia in the west to Syria in the east, from Italy on the north shore to Libya on the south, in Turkey and the Balkans, in France and in Spain, one finds the remains of cities whose beauty and grace and grandeur fill the observer with awe and wonder.
Not only are some of the buildings still standing (the theater at Ephesus is a spectacular example), but the books—among them the Aeneid of Virgil and the Lives of Plutarch—written by the inhabitants of these cities and the languages they used—Latin and Greek—still terrorize adolescents and delight their teachers. Under the British Empire, men who as youths had their minds stuffed with Greek and Latin conjugations ruled large regions of the world. Whether early Christians spoke Latin or Greek, lived in Alexandria in Egypt or Carthage in North Africa (present day Tunisia), they were formed by Greek or Latin literature.
How Augustine loved Virgil—the “renowned poet,” as he called him. As a student Augustine wept over the death of Dido, the Punic queen who took her own life out of love. Learned Christians read Plato’s Timaeus before Genesis and Thucydides before the Acts of the Apostles. Clement of Alexandria, a Greek Christian writer who flourished about the year A.D. 200, effortlessly cited hundreds of passages from Greek poets, philosophers, playwrights, and historians in his writings. To this day he is an unparalleled source of classical citations from lost works, including many precious passages from the writings of pre-Socratic philosophers.
Clement’s writings, like those of other Christian authors in the earlier centuries, were didactic in the broad sense of that term. They were written to instruct and edify, to explain and defend. They would not have been called “literature,” that is, works of the imagination to be read for pleasure at one’s leisure. The first Christian to compose genuine literary works was Aurelius Prudentius Clemens, who was born into a Christian family in Roman Hispania (present-day Spain), in the northeast province of Tarraconensis, in A.D. 348. As a child of the provincial aristocracy, he received a traditional education, which meant he studied Latin grammar, rhetoric, and, finally, law. When his studies were completed, he pursued a conventional career as an advocate and then was offered a position in the civil administration. What sets Prudentius apart is that he saw himself as a poet by profession. He was not a bishop but a layman with a vocation as poet. In his words, “If I cannot give praise to God by my works, let my soul praise God with my voice.”
Prudentius wrote his poems to be read aloud in a living room or salon or used as a basis for reflection in the solitude of one’s study. Two works in particular stand out. The first is Peristephanon, Crown of Martyrdom, a highly original collection of fourteen poems on martyrs. With these poems Prudentius was forging a Christian past—a historical memory for the emerging Christian culture. Besides the great heroes of faith in the Scriptures, Christianity could celebrate “the noble army of martyrs,” as the Te Deum has it. Crown of Martyrdom includes poems on martyrs from Spain and the city of Rome, on Peter and Paul, on St. Agnes and St. Laurence, even on a soldier named Quirinius.
Prudentius also wrote the first Christian epic—a long, allegorical poem called Psychomachia (spiritual warfare), about the internal struggle that takes place in every human soul visited by grace.
Every poet depends on readers who can appreciate and enjoy form as well as content, and his poetry would not have been possible had there not been a long tradition of Latin poetry before the rise of Christianity. Prudentius’ models were not the Psalms or the “canticles” in the Scriptures but the classical Latin poets, and his readers took delight in his metrical virtuosity and verbal allusions to Virgil or Ovid or Horace. One small tribute to his greatness is that, in a library in Gaul, a few generations after his death, his works were kept on a shelf alongside those of Horace. Medieval Latin readers loved his poetry—the Psychomachia was copied over and over—because Prudentius successfully used traditional forms to express a Christian vision.
Prudentius wrote at a time when the foundations were being laid for a new Christian civilization. Like the architects who set about designing churches for the new Christian society and the artists who took up the challenge of depicting Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints in paint and mosaic, gold and stone, Prudentius put language at the service of the new civilization: He offered his words as a vehicle for the Word. In doing so, he consciously sought to redefine the beautiful by referring to Christ while building on the foundation of the old. Through the luxuriance of his language and the facility of his meter, he achieved a richness of form beyond the reach of earlier Christian writers and a freshness of spirit long forgotten by Latin poets. His work is at once deeply Christian and indisputably musical, and he set Christian tradition on a course that, centuries later, gave rise to a poet as enchanting as Edmund Spenser.
In Prudentius’ day the Latin culture of the Roman world was still intact, and a learned public could appreciate his complicated meter and wordplay. But a time was coming when the cultured society Prudentius could take for granted would go into decline and almost disappear. In that new time, no longer was the Church faced with the task of transforming what had been received; now, its vocation was to preserve and hand on what was being forgotten. People had to be taught to read and write and speak Latin correctly. Consequently, some prescient Christian thinkers turned their attention to grammar, which Dante called la prima arte. As with Prudentius, the intellectual inheritance of the ancients is evident in the grammarians’ writings, but in a quite different way.
Among early medieval writers who devoted their literary efforts to grammar, the Spaniard Isidore, bishop of Seville, stands out. By the time Isidore was born, in 560, the Roman Empire in the West had long since collapsed. The territories once under its dominion—Italy, Gaul, and Spain—were ruled by Germanic kings. Born into the landed gentry of Cartagena, Isidore was educated at an episcopal school in Seville under the supervision of his brother Leander, the bishop of the city. In the year 600 Isidore succeeded Leander as bishop. Isidore had a profound influence on the Spanish church, its liturgy, its laws, and its relation to the Visigothic kings. But he commands our attention because of his interest in language and in organizing the knowledge that had been inherited from the past.
The work that best represents his genius is known as the Etymologies. It is a vast encyclopedia that attempted to summarize all branches of knowledge by drawing on the vast reservoir of classical writers: Aesop, Apuleius, Aristotle, Julius Caesar, Catullus, Cicero, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Hesiod, Homer, Horace, Juvenal, Livy, Lucretius, Ovid, Pindar, Plato, Plautus, Quintilian, and Virgil.
The Etymologies deals with grammar, rhetoric, mathematics, medicine, law, ecclesiastical books and offices, languages, kingdoms, human beings, animals, weights and measures, agriculture, ships, architecture, and clothes. Isidore was engaged in an enterprise not unlike that of my former colleague at the University of Virginia, Eric Hirsch. Hirsch showed that to engage in such an apparently simple task as reading a book or newspaper, one must know certain things. He published a Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, full of lists of the meanings of words and things and places and persons, and a series of books entitled What Your Fifth Grader Has to Know.
Isidore also wrote a work entitled Liber differentiarum sive de proprietate sermonum, a book on the precise meaning of words–that is, the distinctions one must make to use them correctly. One example is the difference between aptum and utile: the first refers to something that is temporal, that is, for a time; the second refers to an enduring condition. Similarly, with alterum and alius, the first refers to the other of two and the second, to other among many. Comparing audire and exaudire, the one means to hear, the other, to listen. Sanguis and cruor are two words for blood. One refers to blood as lifeblood; the other, to the blood that flows from a wound. The list is not unlike what one finds in Fowler’s Modern English Usage: the differences between sensuous and sensual, fewer and lesser, further and farther, depreciate and deprecate, as and like.
The pedantic grammarian serves as a standard comic figure, but civilization is a thin and fragile thing, and respect for language cannot be taken for granted. Just as stewards of English need to work overtime in our society, so in the sixth century, when spoken Latin was developing into the Romance languages, early medieval thinkers learned that they had to be diligent about grammar, spelling, correct use of terms, and the like.
Isidore, like the famous Roman grammarian and rhetorician Quintilian, recognized that grammar is “the science of correct speech and the interpretation of the poets.” It is not simply a matter of knowing which case goes with which preposition or when to use the subjunctive; it is a study of the features of language and the rules that govern the relation of words and concepts. Grammar teaches students to make distinctions and to use words accurately; it introduces concepts such as analogy and explains the different figures of speech. For Isidore grammar also included etymology: “If you know the origin of a word, you more quickly understand its force. Everything can be more clearly comprehended when its etymology is known.”
Isidore’s work was intended to serve copyists and to make possible the reading of the Bible. But by taking responsibility for elementary education, he also encouraged clear and cogent thinking; this, in turn, lent solidity, authority, and elegance to writing. For Isidore grammar and lexicography were instruments of culture. Indeed, to produce the kind of works he did, drawing on examples from ancient literature, especially in the conditions of his time, required uncommon perseverance and discipline and a well-organized scriptorium for copying earlier books.
Christianity cannot send down deep roots, be handed on from one generation to the next, or flourish without language. Reason is unthinkable without language—a truth that was seen with great perspicacity by J.G. Hamann, the critic of the Enlightenment. “Language is the mother of reason and its revelations, its Alpha and Omega,” he wrote. That our words should follow rules handed down by authorities who are themselves servants of past masters of language provides a fitting preparation for the ordering of common life according to divine commandments handed down from the apostolic tradition.
In the second century Tertullian, the first Christian to write in Latin, already recognized the intimate relation between faith and language. In his day the Latin language and literature were wedded to the gods of Rome. One could not teach Virgil’s Aeneid without introducing students to the Roman gods. As Tertullian put it, in Roman society literature has an affinity with idolatry. For many this alliance offered a vehicle to upbraid Christians: If they cannot teach literature because its content runs against their beliefs, let them remain unlearned. But, responded Tertullian, learning one’s letters is essential for human life. Christians cannot repudiate secular learning; without language divine learning is ephemeral.
Often, the relation between Christianity and classical culture focuses on the great issues of philosophy. As important as metaphysics might be, Prudentius and Isidore display subtle ways in which Catholic culture draws its moisture from the river of antique culture. Prudentius assumes that the language and forms of Latin poetry can be adapted to the Christian mysteries and create poetry as elegant and refined as that of the great Latin poets. Facing a different challenge, Isidore of Seville returns to basics, not only providing a reservoir of knowledge for the medieval world but also molding the linguistic and conceptual categories that shape literary and intellectual life. And, lest the point be forgotten, this priceless inheritance is the work of a Catholic bishop.
At the University of Virginia, in old Cabell Hall—an auditorium used for classical concerts—a large picture, about forty feet in width and perhaps thirty feet high, dominates the stage. Wherever one sits in the auditorium, there is a good view of the picture; during a concert one can view it throughout the evening. The painting is a copy of Raphael’s School of Athens, a work created for the papal apartments in Rome in 1510–1511, when the artist was in his late twenties. It shows a large Renaissance portico with a magnificent barrel ceiling that opens into a spacious hall. In the center, at the top of a few steps, stand Plato and Aristotle, Plato apparently holding the Timaeus, and Aristotle gripping his Ethics. Around them on either side are the intellectual giants of ancient Greece—Ptolemy, Archimedes, Euclid, Diogenes, Epicurus, Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and others. The painting represents the major intellectual disciplines, and it was placed in Cabell Hall to reflect the high ideals to which the university aspires.
Standing alone, the School of Athens expresses the confidence and self-sufficiency of man to know the truth through his own intellectual efforts. Although Cabell Hall was built long after the death of Thomas Jefferson, Raphael’s painting is a fitting monument to the ideals of the Enlightenment. All that society needs, the painting suggests, can be found in ancient Athens.
But many who sit in Cabell Hall and contemplate the School of Athens do not realize, unless they have been to Rome to visit the Stanze di Raffaello, that Raphael painted two pictures that face each other across a modest-sized room. The title of the second picture is sometimes given as the Disputa, or the Disputation over the Sacrament , but it is more appropriately entitled the Adoration of the Sacrament. In the center sits a large monstrance on an altar, with an exposed host of the Eucharist. Above, in ascending order, are the dove of the Holy Spirit, Christ, and, at the apex, God the Father.
In this painting, as in the School of Athens, most of the figures are identifiable: the four Latin doctors of the Church—Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory the Great; medieval teachers Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure; spiritual leaders Dominic and Francis; artists Fra Angelico and Bramante; and the poet Dante. Flanking Christ are the Virgin Mary and John the Baptist; around them one sees Abraham, Moses, David, Jeremiah, Peter and Paul, John the Evangelist, and other biblical saints. The School of Athens is laid out on a horizontal axis, with its several groups extending like an animated frieze across the width of the picture. The Disputa, however, is arranged on a vertical as well as a horizontal axis, and the two axes converge on the host. The world below and the world above communicate with each other, and the entire scene is crowned by a golden light that streams from above.
I had known of Rafael’s Disputa, but it was not until I visited the Stanze di Raffaello and saw the two paintings facing each other that I realized why I had always been dissatisfied with the reproduction of the School of Athens in Cabell Hall. As beautiful and uplifting as it is, taken by itself it is partial and limiting, closed off to the light from above. It offers a frail foundation for a true humanism. “Reason,” wrote Dante, “even when supported by the senses, has short wings.” Raphael’s Disputa lifts our minds toward things that cannot be seen while putting before us those who, in the words of the Book of Wisdom, obtained “friendship with God” and were “commended for the gifts that come from instruction.”
What is missing from the School of Athens is not only the light from above, but also men and women of faith, like Prudentius and Isidore, who pursued the arts and sciences because they were believers. They had confidence they could know human things because they had seen divine things. In an individual believer, faith can exist without reason. God does not measure out the supernatural gifts of grace according to IQ. Yet, as a community, the Church needs reason to give faith cultural heft and the density of varied expression in language, whether it be the disciplined, imaginative reasoning that poetry requires, or the elementary, conceptual reasoning of grammar. Reason, for its part, needs faith because the natural powers of the human intellect easily lose sight of their goal, which is the fullness of truth, and can become susceptible to various forms of authoritarianism and intolerance.
The two paintings are complementary and together are a fitting monument to the relation between Christianity and classical culture. Raphael was not a creature of the Enlightenment, pitting reason against faith. He intuitively expressed the “secondarity” of Christian culture, treating the world symbolized by the School of Athens as a part of the Church’s patrimony, working in tandem with its doctrine that the one God is known as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—as St. Paul taught in front of the Areopagus, quoting from a poet of Athens to draw his listeners toward the truths of faith.
Athens and Jerusalem belong together. Christian culture is never solely religious; it embraces what is best in thought, literature, art, and the sciences—a truth St. Paul saw at the very beginning of the Church’s history. In the Letter to the Philippians he wrote, “Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think on these things.” And so we must and do.
Robert Louis Wilken, chairman of the board of the Institute on Religion and Public Life, is the William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of the History of Christianity Emeritus at the University of Virginia.
Protestants and Natural Law
by J. Daryl Charles
First Things
It is hard to make generalizations about Protestant theology, given the inherently splintered nature of Protestantism and the multiplicity of theological fads found within its borders. Nevertheless, people who otherwise have very little in common theologically are remarkably joined in their opposition to natural-law thinking. This opposition is found among both revisionists and those who are confessionally orthodox. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to name a single major figure in recent Protestant ethics who has developed and defended a theory of natural law.
Among more orthodox thinkers, objection to the natural law takes several forms. Many, Protestant evangelicals in particular, presume that natural-law thinking fails to take seriously the condition of human sin and places misguided trust in the powers of human reason debilitated by the Fall. Consequently, natural-law theory is thought to be insufficiently Christocentric and located outside the realm of grace, thereby engendering a version of works-righteousness. These critics remain skeptical out of a concern that natural law is autonomous and somehow external to the center of theological ethics and God’s providential care of the world.
Because much of the bias against natural-law thinking is rooted in theological conviction, religiously grounded objections to natural law must be taken seriously. But the belief, however widespread, that natural-law thinking is insufficiently Christocentric and therefore detracts from divine grace is misguided. Nothing of the sort was believed by the early Church Fathers, the medieval fathers, or the Protestant Reformers. Indeed, Scripture presumes natural law as a realm of “common grace” that is accessible to all people by virtue of creation—hence, in St. Paul’s terms, all are “without excuse” (Rom. 1:20).
However deeply entrenched the bias against natural-law thinking is among Protestant thinkers, it cannot be attributed to the Reformers of the sixteenth century themselves. While it is decidedly true that they championed a particular understanding of grace and faith, this was not to the exclusion of other vehicles of divine agency. Rather, they assumed that the natural law had a moral and theological place in their system.
The conventional stereotype of such theologians as Luther and Calvin is that, in their concern to stress the primacy of faith, Scripture, grace, and forensic justification, they cared little about—or effectively denied—the natural law of their Catholic counterparts. Natural-law thinking, however, is firmly ensconced in Luther’s thought. In his 1525 treatise How Christians Should Regard Moses, he distinguishes the natural law from the law of Moses, with its historically conditioned components, stipulations, and illustrations for theocratic Israel. “If the Ten Commandments are to be regarded as Moses’s law, then Moses came too late,” Luther quips somewhat wryly, for “Moses agrees exactly with nature” and “what Moses commands is nothing new.” And, he adds, Moses “also addressed himself to far too few people, because the Ten Commandments had spread over the whole world not only before Moses but even before Abraham and all the patriarchs. For even if a Moses had never appeared and Abraham had never been born, the Ten Commandments would have had to rule in all men from the very beginning, as they indeed did and still do.”
The law that stands behind the Ten Commandments, according to Luther, “was in force prior to Moses from the beginning of the world and also among all the Gentiles.” Indeed, he adds, “We will regard Moses as a teacher, but we will not regard him as our lawgiver—unless he agrees with both the New Testament and the natural law.” And where the Mosaic law and the natural law are one, “there the law remains and is not abrogated externally.” Luther’s position is unambiguous: The moral norms that apply to all people, Christians and non-Christians, are the same. There are not two ethical standards that exist within the realm of divine revelation.
Luther adopts the basic definition of natural law set forth in Philip Melanchthon’s commentary on Romans 2:15, for the natural law is “a common judgment to which all men alike assent, and therefore one which God has inscribed upon the soul of each man.” “Everyone,” observes Luther, “must acknowledge that what the natural law says is right and true.” All carry along with them “in the depth of their hearts a living book which could give them quite adequate instruction about what they ought to do and not to do, how they ought to judge, and what ought to be accepted and rejected.” There is no person who does not sense the effects of the natural law.
Luther is well aware of the common misperception among religiously minded people that “natural law” is presupposed by only “Christian” societies. To the contrary, he insists, it is verified by human experience that all nations and all cultures possess this rudimentary knowledge. The natural law “is written in the depth of the heart and cannot be erased.” In fact, people bring this awareness, this natural moral sense, when they come into the world. Although this natural law was merely concretized through the Decalogue on Mount Sinai, nations knew of the moral realities behind these laws before the law formally was given to Israel.
In his treatise Temporal Authority, Luther deliberates over particular situations that require Christians to participate intelligibly with unbelievers in the public square. Two such situations that potentially involve believer and unbeliever are the unlawful seizure of private property and resolving financial debts. Luther exhorts his readers to use both “the law of love” and “the natural law.” When love has no observable effect, however, natural law must be our guide, since it is that “with which all reason is filled.” Societies, therefore, “should keep written laws subject to reason, from which they originally welled forth as from the spring of justice.” If neither of the concerned parties is Christian, Luther notes, “then you may have them call in some other judge, and tell the obstinate one that they are acting contrary to God and natural law.” Theologically, Luther is content to allow the natural law and righteousness that comes by faith to stand side by side. And he is representative of the Protestant Reformers as a whole, presupposing the natural law to be at work within all people and thus lodged at the core of Christian social ethics. Otherwise, one could not appeal to the human conscience.
Given the emphasis on divine sovereignty and human depravity in the Institutes, one would expect Calvin to have a dim view of natural law. But he is, in fact, keenly aware of St. Paul’s argument in Romans that the Gentiles “show the work of the law written on their hearts.” Calvin maintains the Thomistic assumption that man is by nature a “social animal” and therefore inclined, “from natural instinct, to preserve society.” No civil order, he insists, is possible without just laws, the seeds of which are “implanted in the breasts of all” by a transcendent lawgiver. Moreover, these seeds remain unaffected by the vicissitudes of life; neither war nor catastrophe nor crime nor human disagreement can alter these moral intuitions, since nothing can destroy “the primary idea of justice.”
In light of Calvin’s attention to human depravity and the effects of sin on the human mind, one might be tempted to exclude natural revelation from Calvin’s theological system. But to acknowledge the pervasiveness of sin and human depravity, for Calvin, is not to obliterate the rudimentary moral sense in each person: “We certainly cannot say that (the Gentiles) are altogether blind as to the rule of life. Nothing is more common than for men to be sufficiently instructed in right conduct by natural law.” He acknowledges that, despite “man’s perverted and degenerate nature,” the image of God is not “totally annihilated and destroyed.” Rather, “some sparks still shine” in human creation. The natural law is “that apprehension of the conscience which distinguishes sufficiently between just and unjust, and which deprives men of the excuse of ignorance while it proves them guilty by their own testimony.”
Covenant and natural law function together in the political theology of Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531) as a buttress against tyranny and a safeguard of the rights of the citizenry. Conjoined to the natural law, covenant furnishes the basis for civil obligations binding on all human beings and all societies. With the other Reformers, Zwingli believes that all human laws should conform to the natural law, which he understands to be the equivalent of “true religion”—“the knowledge, worship, and fear of the supreme deity.” The “law of nature,” as Zwingli perceives it, is set by God on the heart of man and confirmed by the grace of God through Christ. This internal light is owing to the work of God’s Spirit in every person and strengthened only after conversion to Christ. Because of human depravity, Zwingli reasons, humans cannot act justly; hence, the necessity of the “law of nature” as the divine imprint on the human heart, allowing even pagan unbelievers basic knowledge of good and evil. Without this “restraining” influence on humans of the natural law, society would descend into anarchy. (Zwingli holds to the belief, distinctive to Swiss reformational polity, that only those rulers and magistrates who are God-fearers properly know the natural law.)
Zwingli’s successor in Zurich, Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575), perhaps best known for his role in drafting the Second Helvetic Confession (1566), affirms in even more pronounced ways the “law of nature” as “an instruction of the conscience, and, as it were, a certain direction placed by God himself in the minds and hearts of men, to teach them what they have to do and what to eschew.” This ability to reason morally comes from the Creator, who “both prompts and writes his judgments in the hearts and minds of men.” Thereby, notes Bullinger, even the Gentiles possess a basic discernment between good and evil, so that the natural law functions in the same way as the written law, teaching us “justice, equity, and goodness” and having as its source God himself. “Among all men, at all times and of all ages,” he writes, “the meaning and substances of the laws touching honesty, justice, and public peace is kept inviolable,” and thus the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule have continuing significance.
Despite the significance of such early-modern natural-law thinkers as Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, who protested injustices in the New World based on the natural law, and Hugo Grotius, considered the father of international law, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a decline in claims of a transcendent source for morality. For social reformers, romanticists, revolutionaries, and enlightened despots—from Hobbes and Rousseau to the complete moral autonomy of reason in Kant and the skepticism of Hume—Enlightenment rationalism represents a break with moral tradition. “Nature” and “natural law” are thus set in opposition to the civitas. Hobbes denies what Aquinas had affirmed, that as social creatures we have a natural inclination toward the good of others. And with Kant, a person is subject to no laws other than those imposed by the self. Individual freedom thus renders impotent the natural law through its severance of law and morality, as well as through the noumenal and the phenomenal.
Through the twentieth century, Protestant theology generally mirrored the Enlightenment culture around it. Despite the cleavage between theological fundamentalists and progressives, objections to natural law have united most Protestants.
Few have argued more vehemently for a rejection of natural-law thinking than Karl Barth, whose examination of intellectual trends in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in his book Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, led him to conclude that modern society had embraced an “idealized” and “humanized” understanding of “nature.” This romantic construal of nature, coupled with an increasing secularization of culture, as Barth saw it, blended easily into the core assumptions of Enlightenment thinking and a new humanism. What the spirit of the age demanded of Christianity was a “reasonable” religion, over against the dogma of a revealed, miraculous Christianity.
This emptying of the theistic core created, in Barth’s view, an entirely different religion that had departed from the Christianity revealed through Christ and Scripture. The preoccupation with “nature” and “reason” prepared the way for a secularized humanism that empties Christian faith of its substance, undermines the absolute lordship of Christ, and facilitates the emergence of a “natural theology” that supplants Christocentric faith.
Thus, any theological or philosophical concept rooted in nature Barth viewed as aiming “to undertake the replacement of the command of the grace of God by a sovereign humanism or even barbarism.” Natural theology functions as a Trojan horse inside the walls of Christendom, producing a sort of latent deism. The God of natural law cannot be the God of the Bible, for natural-law theory “creates an autonomous locus of moral reflection completely separate from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It does not take sin seriously and is overly optimistic about the human condition.”
Not inconsequential was a heated debate about natural law that took place between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner during the mid-1940s. Brunner held that nature is normative: It “teaches” and “dictates.” In a sinful world, he wrote in 1937, the “Law of Nature” must be carried out, by which he meant the order of creation. In Justice and the Social Order, written at the end of the Second World War, Brunner observes that “justice transcends human caprice and convention”; it is “a valid standard of sacred authority.” In fact, he argues, if the idea of justice had “remained faithful to its Christian form” and to “the law of nature,” the great breach in the development of law and the state would not have occurred.
The debate between Barth and Brunner is illustrative, for it captures the fundamental disagreement that persists to this day between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The critical question is whether basic moral truths are present and operative within fallen human beings by nature, and thus whether human beings can be held accountable for their actions.
The historic Christian tradition answers yes, but Protestant theology is riddled with suspicion and skepticism about natural-law theory—much of it Barthian, but not all. Another species of opposition to natural-law thinking grounds itself in what it believes to be “radical obedience” to the biblical witness to Jesus. Perhaps the most persuasive representative of this view is Anabaptist theologian John Howard Yoder, whose well-known work The Politics of Jesus argues that the authentic Christian social ethic is rooted in a radical understanding of Jesus’ teaching and a particular reading of the Sermon on the Mount.
In seeking to understand the political order theologically, Yoder believes that two dominant interpretations have clouded our thinking. One rests on the “catholic” concept of natural law, which presumes an overly optimistic view of human nature and capacity for divine revelation. The other, the “Augustinian-reformed” version, entails “necessary compromise” with “the powers” for the purpose of “preservation.” Both of these, Yoder insists, are “unacceptable.”
Undergirding much of Yoder’s work is the assumption that the early Church wrongly absorbed pagan philosophical influence—for example, the Stoic emphasis on reason and the law of nature—which allowed it, by Ambrose and Augustine’s day, to be compromised by the political powers. Christian ethics, according to Yoder, evolved in such a way as to justify Christian presence and participation in the Roman imperium; hence, the need for a “radical critique of Constantinianism.” The history of the Church, for Yoder, is one long, unrelenting road of apostasy and cultural idolatry until the period of the “radical Reformation” in the sixteenth century. Christian ethics, as Yoder conceives it, is located neither in human “nature” nor in rational notions of justice or the common good. Rather, it subsists in our radical obedience to Jesus’ ethic of nonviolent resistance to political and social oppression.
For Yoder, the political powers are always and irrevocably fallen—inevitably opposed to the purposes of God. Revelation 13, not Romans 13, presents the state as it really is. In Discipleship as Political Responsibility, Yoder writes, “The divine mandate of the state consists in using evil means to keep evil from getting out of hand.” Because political power is inherently evil, any cooperation with political power compromises the Christian, for the state is “a pagan institution in which Christians would not normally hold a position.” If our understanding of the cross were properly formed, we would avoid the triumphalist temptation and assume our place, with the crucified Lamb, in opposition to the powers in whatever form they might appear.
In his writing, Yoder sets forth what he understands to be Jesus’ prophetic stance over against other standard models of ethical decision making, which Yoder believes have distracted us over the last several centuries. One such distraction is the Catholic insistence that nature and grace do not stand in opposition. This, Yoder believes, has “foreshortened” the vision of the Kingdom of God by its focus on “the nature of things” in this fallen world. The result, he worries, is national idolatry and patriarchy.
Given the genesis of sixteenth-century Anabaptism, with persecution coming from both the Catholic and the Protestant sides, Yoder’s pessimism toward the natural law is understandable, and he is at his best when critiquing the Christian community’s tendency toward cultural idolatry. But he is also at his worst to the extent that he is unwilling to submit his notion of moral formation—and Christian social ethics—to the collective wisdom of the historic Christian tradition. Given his overarching commitment to ideological pacifism, Yoder’s rejection of the natural law might be viewed as a result, not a cause, of his pacifist ethics. Like Barth, Yoder believes that natural law is “an addition” to the Word of God as divine revelation. In this regard, he believes, “the warning of the Barmen confessor [Barth] is still needed.”
In assorted writings, the Methodist theologian Stanley Hauerwas confesses his debt to Yoderian Anabaptism, wishing to advance Yoder’s vision of Christian social ethics. A prolific writer and innovative thinker, Hauerwas has been explicit in his rejection of the natural law—notably in The Peaceable Kingdom and Truthfulness and Tragedy. As with Yoder, the deep-seated distrust of natural-law thinking for Hauerwas is related to the Church’s purported compromise with “Constantinianism.” Accordingly, “the alleged transparency of the natural law norms reflects more the consensus within the Church than the universality of the natural law itself.” This is substantiated for Hauerwas by “the fact that the power of natural law as a systematic idea was developed in and for the Roman imperium and then for ‘Christendom.’”
The natural-law tradition, as interpreted by Hauerwas, is a “culturally assimilationist” attempt at Christian ethics that mirrors the Church’s cultural captivity. Moral theology gives expression to “an unquestioned ecclesial assumption” rather than to the practice of Christian virtue. Hauerwas believes that the “abstractions” of “nature and grace” have “distorted how ethics has been undertaken in the Catholic tradition.” And while Hauerwas does acknowledge contact between Christian ethics and “other forms of the moral life,” he believes these “are not sufficient to provide a basis for a ‘universal’ ethic grounded in human nature per se.”
Responding to ethicist James Gustafson’s charge that his ethical approach is sectarian, Hauerwas reasons: “I certainly have never denied the Christian affirmation of God as Creator; rather, I have refused to use that affirmation to underwrite an autonomous realm of morality separate from Christ’s lordship.” As it happens, the widespread worry about “autonomy”—like the parallel assumption that nature and grace stand in opposition—erects a false dualism that finds no place in historic Christian theology. It is a fairly late development, found predominately in post-Reformational Protestant theology.
Ultimately, Hauerwas believes that “Christian ethics theologically does not have a stake in ‘natural law,’” which he believes to be a “primitive metaphysics.” Mirroring Yoder’s commitment to pacifism and nonviolent resistance to the state, Hauerwas suggests that the natural-law tradition offers justification for war and violence: “If just war is based on natural law, a law written in the conscience of all men and women by God, then it seems that war must be understood as the outgrowth of legitimate moral commitments.” Just use of force and reluctantly going to war for justified purposes are for Hauerwas necessarily “the compromises we make with sin” and “cooperating with sin.” In this context, however, John Courtney Murray’s basic distinction between “violence” and “force” is worth noting: “Force is the measure of power necessary and sufficient to uphold . . . law and politics. What exceeds this measure is violence, which destroys the order of both law and politics . . . . As an instrument, force is morally neutral in itself.”
Far from preparing society for violence, the natural law preserves social bonds and guards basic freedoms. Not only is it the grammar of a common moral discourse that Christians must use with pagans, it is also part of divine revelation, by which the public square is preserved. Christian ethics does not compromise by seeking to work for justice in the public square based on the natural law and shared humanity. One of the most important lessons we Protestants can learn from those who have championed the permanent things is that public morality must rest on public principles—principles that are rooted in the fabric of creation.
“The idea that Christianity brought an entirely new ethical code into the world is a grave error,” C.S. Lewis insists in Christian Reflections. “If it had done so, then we should have to conclude that all who first preached it wholly misunderstood their own message: for all of them, its Founder, His precursor, His apostles, came demanding repentance and offering forgiveness, a demand and an offer both meaningless except on the assumption of a moral law already known and already broken.” It is no more possible, Lewis argues, “to invent a new ethics than to place a new sun in the sky. Some precept from traditional morality always has to be presumed. We never start from a tabula rasa: if we did, we should end, ethically speaking, with a tabula rasa.”
At the heart of the rejection of natural law by Protestant social ethics is the erection of a false dichotomy between nature and grace, leading to the mistaken assumption, particularly among evangelical Protestants, that the natural law is distinct from “Christian social ethics.” This mistaken distinction fails to see the role our common human nature plays in moral theory and moral discourse—and thus it undermines any attempts to enter the public square, where critical ethical issues are at stake.
At best, we convince ourselves that, in our radical commitment to the ethics of Jesus—or in our radical separation and denunciation of the powers, or in our detached apocalypticism—we most faithfully embody Christian discipleship and Christian social ethics. At worst, we delude ourselves by being severed from the mainstream of historic Christian thought, even when we believe we are acting prophetically. In practice, this posture prevents us from entering into responsible dialogue with unbelievers. There remains no ethical language intelligible to the nonbeliever. In the end, apart from natural law, we lose any basis upon which to build a moral apologetic and to contribute meaningfully to civil society.
For many Protestants, the word law can be explained only in terms of Christ, “the Spirit’s leading,” and a concept of grace that is confined to a reading of the New Testament in ethical discontinuity with the Old Testament. But the quandary of law is not merely a Christian question; it is rather a human question, as Wolfgang Pannenberg has rightly argued. Since law is part of creation, the order of things as they are, it is a biblical, an anthropological, and an eminently theological question: Human beings cannot avoid or deny their true nature, which, made in the image of God, seeks order.
Thus, natural theology concerns cosmic reality, not human autonomy. And cosmic reality entails law. The structure of law is such that it informs the commandments and forms the basis for ethics. The New Covenant in no way abrogates this moral reality. Therefore, law cannot be severed from authentic Christian religion and social ethics.
While love speaks to the proper motivation, law provides the God-given structure within which obedience is performed. St. Paul and St. James speak with one voice in this regard: Love fulfills the law. And short of the eschaton, law will always and everywhere be necessary-for ?justice has an abiding character and a universal shape.
J. Daryl Charles is an associate professor in the department of Christian studies, Union University, and the author of the forthcoming Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things.
First Things
It is hard to make generalizations about Protestant theology, given the inherently splintered nature of Protestantism and the multiplicity of theological fads found within its borders. Nevertheless, people who otherwise have very little in common theologically are remarkably joined in their opposition to natural-law thinking. This opposition is found among both revisionists and those who are confessionally orthodox. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to name a single major figure in recent Protestant ethics who has developed and defended a theory of natural law.
Among more orthodox thinkers, objection to the natural law takes several forms. Many, Protestant evangelicals in particular, presume that natural-law thinking fails to take seriously the condition of human sin and places misguided trust in the powers of human reason debilitated by the Fall. Consequently, natural-law theory is thought to be insufficiently Christocentric and located outside the realm of grace, thereby engendering a version of works-righteousness. These critics remain skeptical out of a concern that natural law is autonomous and somehow external to the center of theological ethics and God’s providential care of the world.
Because much of the bias against natural-law thinking is rooted in theological conviction, religiously grounded objections to natural law must be taken seriously. But the belief, however widespread, that natural-law thinking is insufficiently Christocentric and therefore detracts from divine grace is misguided. Nothing of the sort was believed by the early Church Fathers, the medieval fathers, or the Protestant Reformers. Indeed, Scripture presumes natural law as a realm of “common grace” that is accessible to all people by virtue of creation—hence, in St. Paul’s terms, all are “without excuse” (Rom. 1:20).
However deeply entrenched the bias against natural-law thinking is among Protestant thinkers, it cannot be attributed to the Reformers of the sixteenth century themselves. While it is decidedly true that they championed a particular understanding of grace and faith, this was not to the exclusion of other vehicles of divine agency. Rather, they assumed that the natural law had a moral and theological place in their system.
The conventional stereotype of such theologians as Luther and Calvin is that, in their concern to stress the primacy of faith, Scripture, grace, and forensic justification, they cared little about—or effectively denied—the natural law of their Catholic counterparts. Natural-law thinking, however, is firmly ensconced in Luther’s thought. In his 1525 treatise How Christians Should Regard Moses, he distinguishes the natural law from the law of Moses, with its historically conditioned components, stipulations, and illustrations for theocratic Israel. “If the Ten Commandments are to be regarded as Moses’s law, then Moses came too late,” Luther quips somewhat wryly, for “Moses agrees exactly with nature” and “what Moses commands is nothing new.” And, he adds, Moses “also addressed himself to far too few people, because the Ten Commandments had spread over the whole world not only before Moses but even before Abraham and all the patriarchs. For even if a Moses had never appeared and Abraham had never been born, the Ten Commandments would have had to rule in all men from the very beginning, as they indeed did and still do.”
The law that stands behind the Ten Commandments, according to Luther, “was in force prior to Moses from the beginning of the world and also among all the Gentiles.” Indeed, he adds, “We will regard Moses as a teacher, but we will not regard him as our lawgiver—unless he agrees with both the New Testament and the natural law.” And where the Mosaic law and the natural law are one, “there the law remains and is not abrogated externally.” Luther’s position is unambiguous: The moral norms that apply to all people, Christians and non-Christians, are the same. There are not two ethical standards that exist within the realm of divine revelation.
Luther adopts the basic definition of natural law set forth in Philip Melanchthon’s commentary on Romans 2:15, for the natural law is “a common judgment to which all men alike assent, and therefore one which God has inscribed upon the soul of each man.” “Everyone,” observes Luther, “must acknowledge that what the natural law says is right and true.” All carry along with them “in the depth of their hearts a living book which could give them quite adequate instruction about what they ought to do and not to do, how they ought to judge, and what ought to be accepted and rejected.” There is no person who does not sense the effects of the natural law.
Luther is well aware of the common misperception among religiously minded people that “natural law” is presupposed by only “Christian” societies. To the contrary, he insists, it is verified by human experience that all nations and all cultures possess this rudimentary knowledge. The natural law “is written in the depth of the heart and cannot be erased.” In fact, people bring this awareness, this natural moral sense, when they come into the world. Although this natural law was merely concretized through the Decalogue on Mount Sinai, nations knew of the moral realities behind these laws before the law formally was given to Israel.
In his treatise Temporal Authority, Luther deliberates over particular situations that require Christians to participate intelligibly with unbelievers in the public square. Two such situations that potentially involve believer and unbeliever are the unlawful seizure of private property and resolving financial debts. Luther exhorts his readers to use both “the law of love” and “the natural law.” When love has no observable effect, however, natural law must be our guide, since it is that “with which all reason is filled.” Societies, therefore, “should keep written laws subject to reason, from which they originally welled forth as from the spring of justice.” If neither of the concerned parties is Christian, Luther notes, “then you may have them call in some other judge, and tell the obstinate one that they are acting contrary to God and natural law.” Theologically, Luther is content to allow the natural law and righteousness that comes by faith to stand side by side. And he is representative of the Protestant Reformers as a whole, presupposing the natural law to be at work within all people and thus lodged at the core of Christian social ethics. Otherwise, one could not appeal to the human conscience.
Given the emphasis on divine sovereignty and human depravity in the Institutes, one would expect Calvin to have a dim view of natural law. But he is, in fact, keenly aware of St. Paul’s argument in Romans that the Gentiles “show the work of the law written on their hearts.” Calvin maintains the Thomistic assumption that man is by nature a “social animal” and therefore inclined, “from natural instinct, to preserve society.” No civil order, he insists, is possible without just laws, the seeds of which are “implanted in the breasts of all” by a transcendent lawgiver. Moreover, these seeds remain unaffected by the vicissitudes of life; neither war nor catastrophe nor crime nor human disagreement can alter these moral intuitions, since nothing can destroy “the primary idea of justice.”
In light of Calvin’s attention to human depravity and the effects of sin on the human mind, one might be tempted to exclude natural revelation from Calvin’s theological system. But to acknowledge the pervasiveness of sin and human depravity, for Calvin, is not to obliterate the rudimentary moral sense in each person: “We certainly cannot say that (the Gentiles) are altogether blind as to the rule of life. Nothing is more common than for men to be sufficiently instructed in right conduct by natural law.” He acknowledges that, despite “man’s perverted and degenerate nature,” the image of God is not “totally annihilated and destroyed.” Rather, “some sparks still shine” in human creation. The natural law is “that apprehension of the conscience which distinguishes sufficiently between just and unjust, and which deprives men of the excuse of ignorance while it proves them guilty by their own testimony.”
Covenant and natural law function together in the political theology of Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531) as a buttress against tyranny and a safeguard of the rights of the citizenry. Conjoined to the natural law, covenant furnishes the basis for civil obligations binding on all human beings and all societies. With the other Reformers, Zwingli believes that all human laws should conform to the natural law, which he understands to be the equivalent of “true religion”—“the knowledge, worship, and fear of the supreme deity.” The “law of nature,” as Zwingli perceives it, is set by God on the heart of man and confirmed by the grace of God through Christ. This internal light is owing to the work of God’s Spirit in every person and strengthened only after conversion to Christ. Because of human depravity, Zwingli reasons, humans cannot act justly; hence, the necessity of the “law of nature” as the divine imprint on the human heart, allowing even pagan unbelievers basic knowledge of good and evil. Without this “restraining” influence on humans of the natural law, society would descend into anarchy. (Zwingli holds to the belief, distinctive to Swiss reformational polity, that only those rulers and magistrates who are God-fearers properly know the natural law.)
Zwingli’s successor in Zurich, Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575), perhaps best known for his role in drafting the Second Helvetic Confession (1566), affirms in even more pronounced ways the “law of nature” as “an instruction of the conscience, and, as it were, a certain direction placed by God himself in the minds and hearts of men, to teach them what they have to do and what to eschew.” This ability to reason morally comes from the Creator, who “both prompts and writes his judgments in the hearts and minds of men.” Thereby, notes Bullinger, even the Gentiles possess a basic discernment between good and evil, so that the natural law functions in the same way as the written law, teaching us “justice, equity, and goodness” and having as its source God himself. “Among all men, at all times and of all ages,” he writes, “the meaning and substances of the laws touching honesty, justice, and public peace is kept inviolable,” and thus the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule have continuing significance.
Despite the significance of such early-modern natural-law thinkers as Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, who protested injustices in the New World based on the natural law, and Hugo Grotius, considered the father of international law, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a decline in claims of a transcendent source for morality. For social reformers, romanticists, revolutionaries, and enlightened despots—from Hobbes and Rousseau to the complete moral autonomy of reason in Kant and the skepticism of Hume—Enlightenment rationalism represents a break with moral tradition. “Nature” and “natural law” are thus set in opposition to the civitas. Hobbes denies what Aquinas had affirmed, that as social creatures we have a natural inclination toward the good of others. And with Kant, a person is subject to no laws other than those imposed by the self. Individual freedom thus renders impotent the natural law through its severance of law and morality, as well as through the noumenal and the phenomenal.
Through the twentieth century, Protestant theology generally mirrored the Enlightenment culture around it. Despite the cleavage between theological fundamentalists and progressives, objections to natural law have united most Protestants.
Few have argued more vehemently for a rejection of natural-law thinking than Karl Barth, whose examination of intellectual trends in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in his book Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, led him to conclude that modern society had embraced an “idealized” and “humanized” understanding of “nature.” This romantic construal of nature, coupled with an increasing secularization of culture, as Barth saw it, blended easily into the core assumptions of Enlightenment thinking and a new humanism. What the spirit of the age demanded of Christianity was a “reasonable” religion, over against the dogma of a revealed, miraculous Christianity.
This emptying of the theistic core created, in Barth’s view, an entirely different religion that had departed from the Christianity revealed through Christ and Scripture. The preoccupation with “nature” and “reason” prepared the way for a secularized humanism that empties Christian faith of its substance, undermines the absolute lordship of Christ, and facilitates the emergence of a “natural theology” that supplants Christocentric faith.
Thus, any theological or philosophical concept rooted in nature Barth viewed as aiming “to undertake the replacement of the command of the grace of God by a sovereign humanism or even barbarism.” Natural theology functions as a Trojan horse inside the walls of Christendom, producing a sort of latent deism. The God of natural law cannot be the God of the Bible, for natural-law theory “creates an autonomous locus of moral reflection completely separate from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It does not take sin seriously and is overly optimistic about the human condition.”
Not inconsequential was a heated debate about natural law that took place between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner during the mid-1940s. Brunner held that nature is normative: It “teaches” and “dictates.” In a sinful world, he wrote in 1937, the “Law of Nature” must be carried out, by which he meant the order of creation. In Justice and the Social Order, written at the end of the Second World War, Brunner observes that “justice transcends human caprice and convention”; it is “a valid standard of sacred authority.” In fact, he argues, if the idea of justice had “remained faithful to its Christian form” and to “the law of nature,” the great breach in the development of law and the state would not have occurred.
The debate between Barth and Brunner is illustrative, for it captures the fundamental disagreement that persists to this day between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The critical question is whether basic moral truths are present and operative within fallen human beings by nature, and thus whether human beings can be held accountable for their actions.
The historic Christian tradition answers yes, but Protestant theology is riddled with suspicion and skepticism about natural-law theory—much of it Barthian, but not all. Another species of opposition to natural-law thinking grounds itself in what it believes to be “radical obedience” to the biblical witness to Jesus. Perhaps the most persuasive representative of this view is Anabaptist theologian John Howard Yoder, whose well-known work The Politics of Jesus argues that the authentic Christian social ethic is rooted in a radical understanding of Jesus’ teaching and a particular reading of the Sermon on the Mount.
In seeking to understand the political order theologically, Yoder believes that two dominant interpretations have clouded our thinking. One rests on the “catholic” concept of natural law, which presumes an overly optimistic view of human nature and capacity for divine revelation. The other, the “Augustinian-reformed” version, entails “necessary compromise” with “the powers” for the purpose of “preservation.” Both of these, Yoder insists, are “unacceptable.”
Undergirding much of Yoder’s work is the assumption that the early Church wrongly absorbed pagan philosophical influence—for example, the Stoic emphasis on reason and the law of nature—which allowed it, by Ambrose and Augustine’s day, to be compromised by the political powers. Christian ethics, according to Yoder, evolved in such a way as to justify Christian presence and participation in the Roman imperium; hence, the need for a “radical critique of Constantinianism.” The history of the Church, for Yoder, is one long, unrelenting road of apostasy and cultural idolatry until the period of the “radical Reformation” in the sixteenth century. Christian ethics, as Yoder conceives it, is located neither in human “nature” nor in rational notions of justice or the common good. Rather, it subsists in our radical obedience to Jesus’ ethic of nonviolent resistance to political and social oppression.
For Yoder, the political powers are always and irrevocably fallen—inevitably opposed to the purposes of God. Revelation 13, not Romans 13, presents the state as it really is. In Discipleship as Political Responsibility, Yoder writes, “The divine mandate of the state consists in using evil means to keep evil from getting out of hand.” Because political power is inherently evil, any cooperation with political power compromises the Christian, for the state is “a pagan institution in which Christians would not normally hold a position.” If our understanding of the cross were properly formed, we would avoid the triumphalist temptation and assume our place, with the crucified Lamb, in opposition to the powers in whatever form they might appear.
In his writing, Yoder sets forth what he understands to be Jesus’ prophetic stance over against other standard models of ethical decision making, which Yoder believes have distracted us over the last several centuries. One such distraction is the Catholic insistence that nature and grace do not stand in opposition. This, Yoder believes, has “foreshortened” the vision of the Kingdom of God by its focus on “the nature of things” in this fallen world. The result, he worries, is national idolatry and patriarchy.
Given the genesis of sixteenth-century Anabaptism, with persecution coming from both the Catholic and the Protestant sides, Yoder’s pessimism toward the natural law is understandable, and he is at his best when critiquing the Christian community’s tendency toward cultural idolatry. But he is also at his worst to the extent that he is unwilling to submit his notion of moral formation—and Christian social ethics—to the collective wisdom of the historic Christian tradition. Given his overarching commitment to ideological pacifism, Yoder’s rejection of the natural law might be viewed as a result, not a cause, of his pacifist ethics. Like Barth, Yoder believes that natural law is “an addition” to the Word of God as divine revelation. In this regard, he believes, “the warning of the Barmen confessor [Barth] is still needed.”
In assorted writings, the Methodist theologian Stanley Hauerwas confesses his debt to Yoderian Anabaptism, wishing to advance Yoder’s vision of Christian social ethics. A prolific writer and innovative thinker, Hauerwas has been explicit in his rejection of the natural law—notably in The Peaceable Kingdom and Truthfulness and Tragedy. As with Yoder, the deep-seated distrust of natural-law thinking for Hauerwas is related to the Church’s purported compromise with “Constantinianism.” Accordingly, “the alleged transparency of the natural law norms reflects more the consensus within the Church than the universality of the natural law itself.” This is substantiated for Hauerwas by “the fact that the power of natural law as a systematic idea was developed in and for the Roman imperium and then for ‘Christendom.’”
The natural-law tradition, as interpreted by Hauerwas, is a “culturally assimilationist” attempt at Christian ethics that mirrors the Church’s cultural captivity. Moral theology gives expression to “an unquestioned ecclesial assumption” rather than to the practice of Christian virtue. Hauerwas believes that the “abstractions” of “nature and grace” have “distorted how ethics has been undertaken in the Catholic tradition.” And while Hauerwas does acknowledge contact between Christian ethics and “other forms of the moral life,” he believes these “are not sufficient to provide a basis for a ‘universal’ ethic grounded in human nature per se.”
Responding to ethicist James Gustafson’s charge that his ethical approach is sectarian, Hauerwas reasons: “I certainly have never denied the Christian affirmation of God as Creator; rather, I have refused to use that affirmation to underwrite an autonomous realm of morality separate from Christ’s lordship.” As it happens, the widespread worry about “autonomy”—like the parallel assumption that nature and grace stand in opposition—erects a false dualism that finds no place in historic Christian theology. It is a fairly late development, found predominately in post-Reformational Protestant theology.
Ultimately, Hauerwas believes that “Christian ethics theologically does not have a stake in ‘natural law,’” which he believes to be a “primitive metaphysics.” Mirroring Yoder’s commitment to pacifism and nonviolent resistance to the state, Hauerwas suggests that the natural-law tradition offers justification for war and violence: “If just war is based on natural law, a law written in the conscience of all men and women by God, then it seems that war must be understood as the outgrowth of legitimate moral commitments.” Just use of force and reluctantly going to war for justified purposes are for Hauerwas necessarily “the compromises we make with sin” and “cooperating with sin.” In this context, however, John Courtney Murray’s basic distinction between “violence” and “force” is worth noting: “Force is the measure of power necessary and sufficient to uphold . . . law and politics. What exceeds this measure is violence, which destroys the order of both law and politics . . . . As an instrument, force is morally neutral in itself.”
Far from preparing society for violence, the natural law preserves social bonds and guards basic freedoms. Not only is it the grammar of a common moral discourse that Christians must use with pagans, it is also part of divine revelation, by which the public square is preserved. Christian ethics does not compromise by seeking to work for justice in the public square based on the natural law and shared humanity. One of the most important lessons we Protestants can learn from those who have championed the permanent things is that public morality must rest on public principles—principles that are rooted in the fabric of creation.
“The idea that Christianity brought an entirely new ethical code into the world is a grave error,” C.S. Lewis insists in Christian Reflections. “If it had done so, then we should have to conclude that all who first preached it wholly misunderstood their own message: for all of them, its Founder, His precursor, His apostles, came demanding repentance and offering forgiveness, a demand and an offer both meaningless except on the assumption of a moral law already known and already broken.” It is no more possible, Lewis argues, “to invent a new ethics than to place a new sun in the sky. Some precept from traditional morality always has to be presumed. We never start from a tabula rasa: if we did, we should end, ethically speaking, with a tabula rasa.”
At the heart of the rejection of natural law by Protestant social ethics is the erection of a false dichotomy between nature and grace, leading to the mistaken assumption, particularly among evangelical Protestants, that the natural law is distinct from “Christian social ethics.” This mistaken distinction fails to see the role our common human nature plays in moral theory and moral discourse—and thus it undermines any attempts to enter the public square, where critical ethical issues are at stake.
At best, we convince ourselves that, in our radical commitment to the ethics of Jesus—or in our radical separation and denunciation of the powers, or in our detached apocalypticism—we most faithfully embody Christian discipleship and Christian social ethics. At worst, we delude ourselves by being severed from the mainstream of historic Christian thought, even when we believe we are acting prophetically. In practice, this posture prevents us from entering into responsible dialogue with unbelievers. There remains no ethical language intelligible to the nonbeliever. In the end, apart from natural law, we lose any basis upon which to build a moral apologetic and to contribute meaningfully to civil society.
For many Protestants, the word law can be explained only in terms of Christ, “the Spirit’s leading,” and a concept of grace that is confined to a reading of the New Testament in ethical discontinuity with the Old Testament. But the quandary of law is not merely a Christian question; it is rather a human question, as Wolfgang Pannenberg has rightly argued. Since law is part of creation, the order of things as they are, it is a biblical, an anthropological, and an eminently theological question: Human beings cannot avoid or deny their true nature, which, made in the image of God, seeks order.
Thus, natural theology concerns cosmic reality, not human autonomy. And cosmic reality entails law. The structure of law is such that it informs the commandments and forms the basis for ethics. The New Covenant in no way abrogates this moral reality. Therefore, law cannot be severed from authentic Christian religion and social ethics.
While love speaks to the proper motivation, law provides the God-given structure within which obedience is performed. St. Paul and St. James speak with one voice in this regard: Love fulfills the law. And short of the eschaton, law will always and everywhere be necessary-for ?justice has an abiding character and a universal shape.
J. Daryl Charles is an associate professor in the department of Christian studies, Union University, and the author of the forthcoming Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things.
A persuasion expert's 4 best tips for being productive when you don't feel like it
by Eric Barker
Business Insider
Ever needed to be productive … but you just don't feel like it? And you literally end up negotiating with yourself in order to get things done?
I end up there all the time. So I wondered: what's the best way for me to convince me to be more productive? What's the best way to use the science of persuasion … on myself?
I knew the answer was a bit beyond my pay grade, so I called an expert …
Robert Cialdini is the Undisputed Heavyweight Champion of persuasion.
He's a professor of psychology at Arizona State University and author of the #1 book on influence — aptly titled: "Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion."
When we want to get others to see things our way we spend the majority of time crafting logical arguments and collecting convincing evidence to present to them … and Bob says that's dead wrong.
In his new book "Pre-Suasion," Bob explains that we need to take a 2500-year-old tip from good ol' Sun Tzu:
What we do before we try to persuade is often more critical to whether or not we are successful.
From "Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade":
So if you're going to persuade yourself to get more done, you need to think about what you do in advance of starting the task.
Talking yourself into doing anything can be tricky because, well, you know what you're planning. So perhaps we should get started by convincing your unconscious mind to help you out…
So you're actually getting some solid work done. You're pleased with yourself. But you're also a little afraid that tomorrow you'll start procrastinating all over again. There's a good way to make sure that doesn't happen …
Leverage the "Zeigarnik effect." (Luckily, you don't have to be able to pronounce it in order to do that.) The Zeigarnik effect is a psychological principle that says our brains seek closure.
Your unconscious mind wants to feel like you "finished" something — otherwise it will keep thinking about that task long after you've left the office.
Well, Bob told me a story about a colleague of his who uses those nagging thoughts to her advantage — to prevent procrastination.
When she's writing and the end of the workday approaches, she stops mid-sentence. That way her brain is dying to finish that thought. And when she gets to her desk the next day she's thankful to be able to complete what she started. Here's Bob:
So take a lesson from those cliffhangers at the end of television episodes. They keep you tuned in for a reason. Your brain wants closure. Don't let it have it.
(To learn the 7-step morning ritual that will keep you happy all day, click here.)
So you know how to turn one productive day into a productive week. But how do you get going in the first place? All it takes is a few magic words …
Ever wish you could just program yourself like a computer to do the right thing? Well, we can't upload Kung fu into your brain, Neo, but we've got the next best thing…
Before it's time to accomplish something, create a clear goal statement that includes the place or time something needs to be done and the thing you have to do. Just use the magic words "If/When" and "Then."
So keep in mind: "If Eric writes a blog post, then I will read it to the very end and thank him profusely."
(To learn how to stop being lazy, click here.)
So you've got an if/then and you're not giving yourself closure. You're programmed to get to work and your unconscious mind will make sure you pick up where you left off tomorrow. But what if you still just ain't feelin' it?
Then you're going to need the inspiration that can only come from bright yellow squares …
Flickr/Jeremy Keith
Ever seen a poster like this before?
Of course you have. Ever scoffed at one? Probably. (Ever viciously mocked one then set it on fire? Oooookay, maybe that's just me then …)
Well, those trite displays of utter tastelessness actually work. When you see "inspirational" pictures like that before you get cranking, you really are more productive. Here's Bob:
No, I am not here to ruin your office decor. You can get the same effect by scribbling "ACHIEVE" on a post-it note and putting it where you can see it.
From "Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade":
(To learn how 5 post-it notes can make you happy, confident and successful, click here.)
So a post-it note can inspire you to get those tough tasks done and help us all win the war against bad art. But what if that isn't enough? Want inspiration that's personalized for you and is proven to bring out your best work?
Alright then: let's talk about Purell…
Doctors don't always wash their hands before they see patients. Hospitals tried to get them to be better about it. Signs were put up saying, "Hand hygiene protects you from catching diseases."
Annnnnnd … that didn't work at all. What did work?
Reminding them of their duty to help those they care for. A sign that read, "Washing your hands reduces your patient's chance of infection" produced a 45% boost. Here's Bob:
I know, I know — maybe you haven't taken the Hippocratic Oath lately. And you don't live by the Bushido Code either. Doesn't matter. If you don't have a commitment to remind yourself of, just make one. But make it something you'll take seriously.
Need an example? Bob has a personal commitment he used to make sure his book "Pre-Suasion" was something he'd be proud of. I'll let Bob tell the story:
Wanting to be a good Grandpa might be the ultimate productivity tool.
(To hear Bob's 6 groundbreaking secrets for how to persuade others, click here.)
Okay, we've learned a lot. Let's round it up …
Here's how Robert Cialdini says you can trick yourself into being more productive:
But that's okay. Anything that you know will get you going is fair game. Give some of Bob's tips a shot. You may need to trick yourself, fool yourself or persuade yourself in order to get those tough tasks finished.
As screenwriter Terry Rossio once said, "My lousy way of getting it done is better than your great way of not doing it."
Business Insider
Ever needed to be productive … but you just don't feel like it? And you literally end up negotiating with yourself in order to get things done?
I end up there all the time. So I wondered: what's the best way for me to convince me to be more productive? What's the best way to use the science of persuasion … on myself?
I knew the answer was a bit beyond my pay grade, so I called an expert …
Robert Cialdini is the Undisputed Heavyweight Champion of persuasion.
He's a professor of psychology at Arizona State University and author of the #1 book on influence — aptly titled: "Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion."
When we want to get others to see things our way we spend the majority of time crafting logical arguments and collecting convincing evidence to present to them … and Bob says that's dead wrong.
In his new book "Pre-Suasion," Bob explains that we need to take a 2500-year-old tip from good ol' Sun Tzu:
Every battle is won before it is fought.
From "Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade":
The best persuaders become the best through pre-suasion— the process of arranging for recipients to be receptive to a message before they encounter it.
Talking yourself into doing anything can be tricky because, well, you know what you're planning. So perhaps we should get started by convincing your unconscious mind to help you out…
When The Going Gets Good, The Good Stop Going
So you're actually getting some solid work done. You're pleased with yourself. But you're also a little afraid that tomorrow you'll start procrastinating all over again. There's a good way to make sure that doesn't happen …
Leverage the "Zeigarnik effect." (Luckily, you don't have to be able to pronounce it in order to do that.) The Zeigarnik effect is a psychological principle that says our brains seek closure.
Your unconscious mind wants to feel like you "finished" something — otherwise it will keep thinking about that task long after you've left the office.
Well, Bob told me a story about a colleague of his who uses those nagging thoughts to her advantage — to prevent procrastination.
When she's writing and the end of the workday approaches, she stops mid-sentence. That way her brain is dying to finish that thought. And when she gets to her desk the next day she's thankful to be able to complete what she started. Here's Bob:
The next day, she can't wait to get back to her chair and begin writing again so that she can complete the thought. Now she's in the flow again of writing, and she winds up being especially productive.
(To learn the 7-step morning ritual that will keep you happy all day, click here.)
So you know how to turn one productive day into a productive week. But how do you get going in the first place? All it takes is a few magic words …
If, When, Then
Ever wish you could just program yourself like a computer to do the right thing? Well, we can't upload Kung fu into your brain, Neo, but we've got the next best thing…
Before it's time to accomplish something, create a clear goal statement that includes the place or time something needs to be done and the thing you have to do. Just use the magic words "If/When" and "Then."
- When I first sit at my desk in the morning, then I will begin the report I have to write.
- If my uncle starts another political argument, then I will hide in the bathroom.
There's a study of epilepsy sufferers who were having trouble being regular with their medication regimen. They were given an "if, when, then" statement to make, such as, "If it's eight o'clock in the morning and I've finished brushing my teeth, then I will take my prescribed medication." That statement increased compliance with the regimen from 55 percent to 79 percent. The key is to be specific about the place and time that serves as a cue for you to take the step that you want to take.
(To learn how to stop being lazy, click here.)
So you've got an if/then and you're not giving yourself closure. You're programmed to get to work and your unconscious mind will make sure you pick up where you left off tomorrow. But what if you still just ain't feelin' it?
Then you're going to need the inspiration that can only come from bright yellow squares …
Flickr/Jeremy Keith
Sticky Notes Make You Gritty
Ever seen a poster like this before?
Of course you have. Ever scoffed at one? Probably. (Ever viciously mocked one then set it on fire? Oooookay, maybe that's just me then …)
Well, those trite displays of utter tastelessness actually work. When you see "inspirational" pictures like that before you get cranking, you really are more productive. Here's Bob:
There's a lovely study that showed that if call center workers were shown a picture of a runner winning a race, they collected 60 percent more donations because the concept of achievement was in their attentional environment. They would see it constantly while they were doing this task.
From "Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade":
Multiple studies have shown that subtly exposing individuals to words that connote achievement (win, attain, succeed, master) increases their performance on an assigned task and more than doubles their willingness to keep working at it.
So a post-it note can inspire you to get those tough tasks done and help us all win the war against bad art. But what if that isn't enough? Want inspiration that's personalized for you and is proven to bring out your best work?
Alright then: let's talk about Purell…
Remind Yourself Of Your Commitments
Doctors don't always wash their hands before they see patients. Hospitals tried to get them to be better about it. Signs were put up saying, "Hand hygiene protects you from catching diseases."
Annnnnnd … that didn't work at all. What did work?
Reminding them of their duty to help those they care for. A sign that read, "Washing your hands reduces your patient's chance of infection" produced a 45% boost. Here's Bob:
A study that was done by Adam Grant and his associates put a little sign under the soap dispensers that said, "Washing your hands reduces your patient's chance of infection." That produced a 45 percent increase simply by reminding the doctors of a commitment that they had made long ago when they began their careers.
Need an example? Bob has a personal commitment he used to make sure his book "Pre-Suasion" was something he'd be proud of. I'll let Bob tell the story:
I dedicated "Pre-Suasion" to my grandchildren. Then I told their parents, "When each of them is old enough to read this book, show them the dedication and say, ‘Your grandfather wrote this book for you.'" Well, Eric, it had better be a good book. It had better be a book that would hold up 15 years later. And here's what I did next — and I'm looking at it right now: I put a picture of my grandkids next to my computer. I made it visible while I was writing the book.
(To hear Bob's 6 groundbreaking secrets for how to persuade others, click here.)
Okay, we've learned a lot. Let's round it up …
Sum Up
Here's how Robert Cialdini says you can trick yourself into being more productive:
- Use the "Zeignarik effect": To make sure you don't procrastinate tomorrow, don't give yourself closure today. If you stop mid-sentence you'll…
- If, When, Then: Program yourself like a computer. For instance, "If I see an opportunity for a lame joke related to psychology, then I will type it."
- Sticky notes make you gritty: You don't need to punish your walls with bad art. Just write "ACHIEVE" on a post-it note.
- Remind yourself of your commitments: And if you don't have one, make one. Wanting to be a great grandpa creates great books.
But that's okay. Anything that you know will get you going is fair game. Give some of Bob's tips a shot. You may need to trick yourself, fool yourself or persuade yourself in order to get those tough tasks finished.
As screenwriter Terry Rossio once said, "My lousy way of getting it done is better than your great way of not doing it."
Tuesday, November 15, 2016
A Charge to Maintain Liberal Arts
by Diane Vincent
The Scriptorium Daily
The Scriptorium Daily
A few weeks ago Biola had the delight of installing our new Provost and Senior Vice President, Dr. Deborah Taylor. Part of the installation involved a series of charges from faculty who had been invited to articulate some of the key challenges ahead of Dr. Taylor in her new role, from Biblical and missional fidelity to commitments to diversity and global impact.
I was tasked with delivering the charge to maintain the commitment to the liberal arts. It was a humbling task to try to speak for and to so many, let alone to in 4 minutes or less distinguish what makes the study of the liberal arts worth striving for at a Christian university. But one of the great things about Torrey is that we are constantly planting the seeds and then tasting the fruit of what the liberal arts has to offer as a handmaiden to theology and worship. That, and I had just finished reading Dante’s Paradise and talking for hours with students about what kind of happiness were we made for exactly. That and I just observed Dr. Todd Thompson lead a class on Augustine’s On Christian Teaching. That, plus the thoughts of John Henry Newman, the Westminster Catechism, Josef Pieper, John Calvin, Thomas Traherne, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, Edmund Burke, Augustine’s City of God, the Gospels, Job, Genesis, Paul’s epistles, and many others from the books we read. So given all that, here’s what I came up with after many years of listening and taking part in the great conversation:
———
“Dr. Taylor,
“We are a place that trains nurses and scholars, equips teachers and engineers, prepares members of symphony orchestras and film crews. We display a dazzling diversity of what it can mean to serve the common good in the name of Jesus Christ. And God is calling our students to be missionaries, to write novels, to start businesses, to raise families, to lead churches, to run cities; He is calling our faculty to write books and articles and symphonies, serve on hospital boards, run master classes, make art. But none of us were made for work. Our truest vocation lies not in the limited and changeable work that we do, but in the call to behold our God. God is calling us not to work for Him forever, but to enjoy Him forever.
“For this vocation, we all, students and faculty alike, need the liberal arts in this learning community. We need the space, the unhurried time, the freedom to cultivate our capacities to understand the truth for the sake of delight, unfettered by any other uses we might put the truth to. For our ability to see and to enjoy persist beyond any immediate practical use we can come up with!
“The exact disciplines listed under the liberal arts have changed over time; for starters, I suppose, we could look back to the 7 liberal arts rooted in the ancient tradition: grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. All exercise the mind in order to nurture the two kinds of enjoyment proper to human beings: the joys of language and the joys of thought. For intrinsically enjoyable are the apt phrase, the elegant sentence, a well-refined argument, a complex pattern discerned and communicated, whether through poetry, music, or a differential equation. These things are in themselves delightful, and the liberal arts grow our ability to see them for what they are, and to simply enjoy them.
“Moreover, pursuing together the joys of language and the joys of thought nurtures our communion with each other and with God; we learn to speak and to hear more truly and fully; we learn to perceive, to understand, and to judge more wisely…about anything! The liberal arts encourages us to consider wisdom not as fragmented facts or disconnected specializations, but as a unified whole, a pattern of relations and significance whose unity comes from being the work of a perfect Creator.
“Dr. Taylor, keep urging us all to return again and again to what is elementary, what is foundational. To consider as carefully as we can first principles, to refine our capacities for the most abstract thinking and clearest expressions of thought, and to search out the ground we humans hold in common with each other, the dead, and the yet unborn, and glory of glories, even with Christ himself, who showed us what being human really means.
“But let us not in that continual return to elementary things, begin to neglect or fragment into disconnected pieces what God has made unified and full of significance. Keep reminding us that all created things, seen rightly and fully for what they are, can lead us back to their Creator. In their goodness, and order, and beauty, we are led to contemplate Him who is perfectly good, all-wise, and sublimely beautiful. Do not let us grow weary of discerning meaning in all the world and in seeking the unity of truth, for, as Augustine says “Wisdom is not many things but one thing in which there are immense and infinite treasuries of intelligible things”.
“And finally, Dr. Taylor, keep preserving for us the kind of freedom we need for speaking clearly and thinking deeply, those activities through which we pursue our truest vocation—the one thing that human beings do entirely for its own sake!—to behold and thereby to love the Lord our God with all our heart, soul, and mind.”
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