Tuesday, February 10, 2009

Dawkins' Critique of the Ontological Argument

Dr. William Lane Craig
ReasonableFaith.org

Question:

Greetings Dr. Craig, both my heart and mind feel very blessed and fulfilled through your presentation of God's character. I am a fan of the ontological argument for God's existence (scary I know). In Richard Dawkins' book, "The God Delusion," he references Douglas Gasking's 'Proof' that God does not exist, which goes like this:

1. The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement imaginable.

2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.

3. The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.

5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a greater being namely, one who created everything while not existing.

6. An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

7. Therefore, God does not exist.

Have you ever rebutted this formation or come across it? What are your thoughts on this formation? Thanks!

Jeff


Dr. Craig responds:

I have to confess that I had never come across this argument until I read it in The God Delusion. The reason for its obscurity isn't hard to divine: it's so wrong-headed that even detractors of the ontological argument who understand that argument would agree that this objection is no good. To see why, let's review the ontological argument.

The version below comes from Alvin Plantinga, one of America's premier philosophers. It's formulated in terms of possible worlds semantics. For those who are unfamiliar with the terminology of possible worlds, let me explain that by "a possible world" one doesn't mean a planet or even a universe, but rather a complete description of reality, or a way reality might be. To say that God exists in some possible world is just to say that there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement "God exists" as part of that description.

Now in his version of the argument, Plantinga conceives of God as a being which is "maximally excellent" in every possible world. Plantinga takes maximal excellence to include such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. A being which has maximal excellence in every possible world would have what Plantinga calls "maximal greatness." So Plantinga argues:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Premises (2)-(5) of this argument are relatively uncontroversial. Most philosophers would agree that if God's existence is even possible, then He must exist. The principal issue to be settled with respect to Plantinga's ontological argument is what warrant exists for thinking the key premiss "It's possible that a maximally great being exists" to be true.

The idea of a maximally great being is intuitively a coherent idea, and so it seems plausible that such a being could exist. In order for the ontological argument to fail, the concept of a maximally great being must be incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor. But the concept of a maximally great being doesn't seem even remotely incoherent. This provides some prima facie warrant for thinking that it is possible that a maximally great being exists.

In his book Dawkins devotes six full pages, brimming with ridicule and invective, to the ontological argument, without raising any serious objection to this argument. (He notes in passing Immanuel Kant's objection that existence is not a perfection; but since Plantinga's argument doesn't presuppose that it is, we can leave that irrelevance aside.) He then cites the parody of the argument you mention above, which is designed to show that God does not exist because a God "who created everything while not existing" is greater than one who exists and created everything.

Ironically, this parody, far from undermining the ontological argument, actually reinforces it! For a being who creates everything while not existing is a logical incoherence and is therefore impossible: there is no possible world which includes a non-existent being which creates the world. If the atheist is to maintain—as he must—that God's existence is impossible, the concept of God would have to be similarly incoherent. But to all appearances it's not. That supports the plausibility of premiss (1) of Plantinga's argument.

I think you can see that Dawkins doesn't even understand the logic of the ontological argument, which moves from the logical possibility of God's existence to its actuality. A parody of the argument that moves from a logical impossibility to actuality is not parallel to the argument.

Dawkins chortles, "I've forgotten the details, but I once piqued a gathering of theologians and philosophers by adapting the ontological argument to prove that pigs can fly. They felt the need to resort to Modal Logic to prove that I was wrong" (God Delusion, p. 84). This is just embarrassing. The ontological argument is an exercise in modal logic—the logic of the possible and the necessary. I can just imagine Dawkins making a nuisance of himself at this professional conference with his spurious parody, just as he similarly embarrassed himself at the Templeton Foundation conference in Cambridge where he describes his confronting sophisticated philosophers and theologians with his flyweight objection to the teleological argument!

If you're interested in further responses to Dawkins' critique of theistic arguments, have a look at Chad Meister and my new book God Is Great, God Is Good, forthcoming this year with Inter-Varsity Press.

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Fear Hath No Shelf-Life: Our Torture Dilemma

By Robert D. Kaplan
The Atlantic

The torture debate is critical not only because it gets us to the core of our values, but because the danger to American cities is not from tanks and armies, but from individuals and their intentions. Saving thousands of American lives may come down to the gifts of a talented interrogator and the tools at his or her disposal. Remember that usually only in the movies does a prisoner spill the beans on an upcoming plot. As interrogators will tell you, information about terrorist activities tends to come in fragments that are assembled from scores of interrogations, even as the truth is distilled—accidentally almost—from a spewing forth of lies and subtle evasions. The front line of our defense against al-Qaeda and its offshoots is painstaking, tedious work that rewards those best able to fill in the blank spaces from a shattered jigsaw puzzle.

Interrogators, because they deal with a single combatant face to face for hours at a time, often develop more sympathy for the enemy than any one else in our security establishment. After all, the combatant, because he has a real face, becomes human to them. Such sympathy is necessary if they are to do their jobs well. “To defeat the enemy you first have to love them—that is, their culture,” an army special forces lieutenant colonel told me years ago in Afghanistan.

Good interrogators become masters at discerning body language and eye movements in the person they are questioning. Their worst enemy is not the inability to torture, but their own bureaucracy, which often doesn’t share vital information with its constituent parts. There is a lot we can do to improve the quality of our interrogations without torturing people.

And yet the problem is not that easily solved. It nags at one. Stating flatly that torture doesn’t work is a narrow version of the truth. Torture may not work, but the fear of it can work wonders. When a prisoner is captured, you may want him to be roughly handled, and put in grim and disorienting surroundings, for that heightens the fear of what might happen to him next. “Fear is often an interrogator’s best ally, but it doesn’t have a long shelf life,” write Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, authors of The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against al-Qaeda, a very wise book by a former interrogator and a journalist. Fear can by extended for a time through clever techniques such as spreading false rumors. Example: the authors report that they received added cooperation from prisoners in Afghanistan after deliberately spreading a rumor that they were going to be sent back to their home countries in the Middle East in return for a $100,000 payment per man. But ultimately, as the weeks pass, and nothing bad happens to him, the prisoner’s fear fades and he becomes less useful. While torture is bad, the thoroughly humane approach, contrary to our desires, has its limits. And that is our dilemma.

Spreading rumors, rough treatment, grim conditions are all the very beginnings of a slippery path toward much worse things. To say that we cannot step even one foot along that path is impractical, for that would deprive the nation of vital intelligence and threaten to leave it defenseless. But to go far along that path is morally unbearable. So the debate is really about how far we do go.

The extreme example that’s frequently discussed—Should we resort to torture in the event of a ticking bomb?—is interesting but statistically not very useful, since most scenarios are much more ambiguous. And again, a single prisoner is more likely to reveal a shard of evidence than the where and when of a plot.

The authors Mackey and Miller describe a group of interrogators who solved their moral dilemma through the use of a technique called “monstering.” That is, if the interrogator had to put up with the same ill-treatment as the prisoner, then it wasn’t immoral. To wit, sleep deprivation combined with long interrogations was allowed if the interrogator himself went without sleep for the same amount of time. But to double-team the prisoner, with one interrogator sleeping while the other worked the prisoner over verbally, was considered immoral. Monstering was a matter of who broke first, the interrogator or the prisoner. And if the prisoner broke first, even part of the time, it was worth doing.

Of course, one could carry this logic as far as waterboarding, since many of our own special operations forces and combat pilots have been waterboarded as part of their training at Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School. Indeed, far more Americans have been waterboarded than prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. But while the Americans who have been waterboarded have been physically and psychologically trained to perfection beforehand, and experience it only for short periods, unsuspecting detainees experience waterboarding under far more onerous circumstances. So what is hard, tough training in one instance, can be torture in another.

But if we can’t—or shouldn’t—waterboard, then how far do we push the envelope? Because if we don’t push it somewhat, we face what I call the 15 percent dilemma. Let me explain.

If we act like angels, and another, even more massive attack occurs in the United States, then the public might cry for blood, as it did to an extent in the immediate days and weeks after 9/11, when torture was occasionally spoken of in different terms than it is now. Remember that some Bush Administration policies were drawn up in the context of one public mood, and carried out in the context of another. Were that to happen, detainees’ rights might decline by, say, 50 percent. But if we push the envelope only 15 percent along that dangerous path, then we might avoid the 50 percent trap, and save many of our own lives.

But even 15 percent makes me queasy. To avoid the question, though, is itself irresponsible.

High Table: Luther

By Melissa Schubert
Scriptorium Daily

Our reading assignment: Martin Luther’s “Theses for the Heidelberg Disputation,” “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” and “The Freedom of the Christian” from Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings.

Faculty training at the Torrey Honors Institute puts our pedagogy to the test. We call our semesterly training meetings ‘High Tables.’ Nothing as lofty as it sounds, we read a curricular text and, led by a colleague, discuss it for three hours.

Led by Dr. Matt Jenson (whose The Gravity of Sin includes some great work on Luther’s doctrine of the same), last week my colleagues and I spent some good words (and a few shabby ones) discussing what Luther might teach us about the gospel, faith, Christ’s finished work, virtue, and good works.

It is the bane of familiarity to breed contempt. But may it never be that the Christian tires of considering the mighty gospel and the great gift of faith. For my own part, I confess that I so often forget and pervert the gospel that I can all too often use a good reminder. I include my favorite section from “The Freedom of the Christian” here in case your memory, too, could use refreshing.

“The third incomparable benefit of faith is that it unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom… And if they are one flesh and there is between them a true marriage—indeed, the most perfect of all marriages, since human marriages are but poor examples of this one true marriage—it follows that everything they have they hold in common, the good as well as the evil… Let faith come between them and sins, death, and damnation will be Christ’s, while grace, life, and salvation will be the soul’s: for if Christ is a bridegroom he must take upon himself the things which are his bride’s and bestow upon her the things that are his.” And Christ submitting to suffering, death, and hell, breaks their power: “for his righteousness is stronger than all the sins of man, his life stronger than death, his salvation more invincible than hell… Thus the believing soul by means of the pledge of its faith is free in Christ, its bridegroom, free from all sins, secure against death and hell, and is endowed with the eternal righteousness, life, and salvation of Christ its bridegroom.”

Some highlights of our discussion follow.

Overarching enquiry: Jenson began our discussion with the following question: Does Luther think the Christian should be virtuous? The question cleverly distracts from the more Lutheran terms ‘works’ and ‘righteousness’ to recall classical concepts of the ethical life, often appropriated for Christian constructs of spirituality. Can the Christian become good? Not in her own power. Should the Christian—knowing her life to be hid in Christ with God, her righteousness to be alien, her only hope the finished work of Christ—presume to become “righteous, free, and a Christian by means of some good work”? Only at the cost of her faith. But Luther, too, teaches that “faith does good works.” So, shouldn’t the Christian be virtuous?

Most radical enquiry: Is it good for a rich man to give his money to the poor if he believes that he is good for doing so? Luther, it seems, says no. In the Heidelberg Disputation Luther claims, “The works of men may always be attractive and seemingly good. It appears nevertheless that they are mortal sins.” Any presumption to be good apart from Christ kills my soul (my body, already mortal). Better for my neighbor to lie, cheat and steal than to be a “good person” because his works are “all the more deadly” when done with “pure and evil assurance.”

Most lexical enquiry: Of course, we asked what is ‘faith’ in Luther. Luther rejects faith as a virtue, but still calls it a hard thing. Its object is Christ (rather than, say, the whole creed.) Are ‘trust’, ‘belief,’ or ‘knowledge’ helpful synonyms?

Most grammatically technical enquiry: Luther writes, “Faith alone is the saving and efficacious use of the Word of God.” It seemed to me that this sentence was syntactically awkward in order to suggest that the efficacious Word of God occasions faith. But is there an implied subject, the one who only uses the Word of God effectively when she believes what she hears and reads (or ministers the Word to the same end)? Who is the origin of faith: the one who hears and believes or the One who promises and speaks?

Most troubling enquiry: Does Luther make the gospel a legal fiction?

Most biographical enquiry: Johann von Staupitz was Luther’s confessor during the season of Luther’s life wherein the knowledge of his sin was making him inconsolable. How do his various counsels to the angst-ridden Luther contribute to Luther’s theology of the cross?

Most pedagogical enquiry: Which hymn might you sing with a class to prepare them for the discussion? Professor Henderson (our resident hymn-leader) prefers the more thematically apt “When I Survey the Wondrous Cross” to the more obvious because the Luther-penned choice, “A Mighty Fortress.” Other options include “O Sacred Head Now Wounded” and “Jesus, Lover of my Soul.”

Most pastoral enquiry: What are good words for students who express anxiety about their faith: is it enough? Luther speaks hard words of peace to the introspective: stop looking at yourself. Look to Christ, the author and finisher of our faith. Do not pervert faith by considering it a meritorious work. Despair of yourself, even with respect to your faith, so long as you look to Christ.

Most tacit enquiry: Talking doctrine, especially such historically divisive doctrine might seem combative and merely heady. But reading and talking Luther with my colleagues was much more hearty and lively than that. The core of our conversation suggested to me another Heidelberg reminder, this time from the catechism, a document that would have birthed a Luther had he not been one of its fathers:

Q: Christian, what is your only comfort in life and in death? A: That I am not my own, but belong—body and soul, in life and in death—to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ.

He has fully paid for all my sins with his precious blood, and has set me free from the tyranny of the devil. He also watches over me in such a way that not a hair can fall from my head without the will of my Father in heaven: in fact, all things must work together for my salvation.

Because I belong to him, Christ, by his Holy Spirit, assures me of eternal life and makes me wholeheartedly willing and ready from now on to live for him.

Conversation and Conversion

By John Mark Reynolds
Scriptorium Daily

Islam has succeeded in much of the world partly because it is intellectually interesting, culturally potent, and has spiritual power. One can acknowledge this while also believing Islam to be fundamentally wrong and knowing the darker side of Islamic history.

President Obama was right to reach out to the Islamic world at his inauguration. Given his background, Obama has a unique chance to promote what is good about the United States while distinguishing those virtues from our problems and failures.

Prejudice sometimes blocks dialogue and, unfortunately, serious thought about Islam has suffered from two sorts of it in the United States.

Extreme secularists cannot engage in real dialogue or a sympathetic study of religions like Islam, because they cannot admit the possibility that any religion could be true. Any American approach to the Islamic world that refuses to talk about religion or treat it seriously is doomed to failure. One can go to the Super Bowl and refuse to talk about the game, there will be quite a few people there just for the “event,” but the majority will think, and are entitled to think, that they are missing the point. It would be even more foolish to go to many football games with ardent fans and never bother to learn a single thing about football.

In the same way dialogue about politics will inevitably bring moral and religious ideas into the discussion, but much of our leadership is educationally ill prepared to start. Much of our elite educational programs ignore serious treatment of religion. Their graduates often don’t even know the names of the players!

Other narrow-minded Americans act as if open- minded dialogue and study of a religion not their own couldn’t possibly be of benefit. Of course, being right about one thing has never been a very good guarantee that you are right about everything else! Even if your religion is correct, a humble and open-minded approach to other perspectives is always valuable. You might after all be wrong and if you are right such an approach makes it more likely that your dialogue partner will listen to you.

Real dialogue begins with both sides acknowledging they might have something to learn and being willing to listen and change. Like former President George W. Bush, President Obama has the right approach to this topic, but unlike Bush he has the global popularity and perceived credibility to advance American interests.

It is obvious that non-Muslims will benefit from this exchange.

Islam has formed important, beautiful, and long lasting human cultures. These have produced orderly nations that have made important contributions to world culture. Order and the rule of law are basic requirements of higher civilizations that Americans are fortunate enough to be able to take for granted. We have sustained them for a very short period of time compared to many Islamic people groups.

Order in Islam comes with charitable activity and a commendable concern for the poor and disadvantaged. For the most part Islam is part of the modern monotheistic moral consensus that dominates most of the world. Most branches of Islam encourage private and public moral behavior that most non-Muslim Americans would also encourage.

Americans too often see the obvious failures of nations where most people are Muslims and simplistically attribute all those failures to Islam. We forget that much of the leadership class in those nations for the last one hundred years was educated in Western socialist economic ideas and were encouraged to adopt totalitarian forms of government from places such as Moscow and Berlin. It is unjust to blame Islam for the relative poverty of nations like Egypt and Indonesia when socialist and nationalist economic policies, put in place by men who were not particularly religious, is a more likely explanation.

Ironically, so-called “Islamic” terrorist groups adopt economic and political policies that have historical roots in European secularism rather than the Koran. Marx is often a better guide than Muhammad in predicting their political and economic behavior!

Dialogue will benefit both sides.

Philosophers and theologians already benefit from the exchange. For example, non-Muslim philosophers of religion currently use arguments such as the kalaam argument for the existence of God that have roots in Islamic philosophy. Any philosopher hoping to understand Platonic and Aristotelian thought will benefit from reading Islamic thinkers. Scholars in many other fields, ranging from law to the arts, gain from careful study of Islamic ideas and achievements.

Of course, this dialogue goes both ways and must take ideas seriously enough to admit the possibility of both sides fundamentally changing their minds. If a scholar becomes convinced that Islam, Christianity, secularism or any other idea is wrong, they must have the right to pursue their ideas to their logical conclusion in the public square without fear.

Many dominantly Christian nations and many dominantly secular nations allow this freedom, but it cannot be taken from granted in much of the Islamic world.

Clergy and laity of my church who argue that Christianity is right and Islam is wrong have been murdered or face credible threats of death. Their governments do not protect them. This is not ancient history, but is happening now. Conversation must carry the possibility of change and conversion to be meaningful. Conversion from one faith to another must not carry a death sentence!

Terrorism also stops all discussion. We cannot listen to the ideas of a terrorist over the screams of their victims. There can be no dialogue with a person, religious or secular, who will not denounce terrorism. There should be no dialogue with those who will not admit the right of Israel to exist or who wish to exterminate the Jewish people.

Our President is right to show no tolerance for any person who despises American virtues. American society allows for a great deal of individual liberty and this is remarkable and good given world history. Surely, however, the hundreds of millions of people in the Islamic world who see our excesses and vice also have a point. When thoughtful external critics say that the American lifestyle has become too associated with instant gratification, a lack of community values, and hedonism, we should listen.

When terrorists use our vices as an excuse to attack us for our virtues, we should fight and win.

President Obama has said these things more eloquently than I can, but now must implement them. President George W. Bush was successful in keeping America free from further terrorist attacks after 9/11. This was an enormous accomplishment for which he has received too little credit, but Bush failed to successfully communicate our ideals to the rest of the world. President Obama must build on the success of the Bush administration while correcting this failure. All patriots hope he does so.

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

When Shall We Be Made Like Our Christ?

By R. A. Torrey
Scriptorium Daily

Q: When will the full change (begun in us by the change in heart) be completed? That is, when shall we be made like our Christ?

A: The moment that one is born again by the power of the Holy Ghost, he is made in a measure like Christ. In his standing before God, he is just like Christ, perfectly accepted, “justified from all things” (Acts 13:38, 39; Rom. 8:1).

Furthermore, at that time he is made in character like Christ, but not perfectly so; as he feeds upon the Word and has personal communion with Christ he becomes more and more like his Lord day by day (II Cor. 3:18). This is a progressive process. He is changed into the image of the Lord “from glory to glory.” That is, in each new time of communion with Him, he catches something more of the Lord’s glory. The transformation is completed and we become perfectly like our Lord at His return. When He comes again, “We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.” (I John 3:2)

Q: Where does it say in the Bible that God prepared hell for man?

A: It does not say so anywhere in the Bible. On the other hand we are distinctly told in the Bible that the everlasting fire was prepared for the devil and his angels. (Matt. 25:41). It was not God’s purpose nor desire that any man should go there –it was not prepared for him, but if any man chooses to cast in his lot with the Devil and his angels by persistently rejecting Jesus Christ and continuing in sin, then he shall have to share the destiny of the Devil and his angels, and be “tormented day and night forever and ever.” (Rev. 20:15.) But he goes there of his own choice and in spite of all God’s gracious works to save him.

Originally published in The King’s Business, January 1913 (Volume 4, Issue 1, p. 38).

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

The Keys of the Kingdom

By R. A. Torrey
Scriptorium Daily

RA Torrey Q and A

Q: Please explain Matt. 16:19, “And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.”

A: It was the custom when our Lord was here upon earth to give to the one who had gone through the Rabbinical schools a key as a symbol of his ability to unlock the truth to men. Our Lord by saying unto Peter that He would give to him the keys of the kingdom of heaven simply meant what the figure indicates, that He would give to him the ability to unlock the truth of the kingdom of heaven to men. We see Peter using the keys with the Jews and unlocking the truth and the door into the kingdom to them in Acts 2:38 and the following verses. We see Peter using the keys with the Gentiles and unlocking the truth and the door into the kingdom to them in Acts 10:34-43. Our Lord made the promise to Peter as a Spirit taught man (cf. V. 16), and every one who is taught of the Spirit has this same power of the keys.

In the usage of our Lord’s Day to “bind and to loose” meant respectively to forbid or permit. It was a proverb in that day that “What Shammai (a very strict rabbi) binds (that is, forbids,) Hillel (a more moderate teacher) looses (that is, permits).” So these words used in this verse simply meant what Peter as a Spirit-taught man forbade was what was forbidden in heaven and what he permitted was what was permitted in heaven; that is, that the teaching of Peter in regard to what a man ought to do or not to do was the true heavenly doctrine. This promise was not made to Peter as a priest or pope, but simply as a Spirit-filled man.

In a similar way our Lord said to His disciples in John 20:22, 23, when He had breathed on them and bestowed upon them the gift of the Holy Ghost, “Whosoever sins ye (that is, ye as Spirit-filled men,) remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye (that is, ye as Spirit-filled men,) retain, they are retained.” In other words, the Spirit-filled teacher has discernment to know where there is true repentance and faith, and in a case where he, as a Spirit-filled teacher, discerns true repentance and faith and declares sins remitted, there is really true repentance and faith and those sins “are remitted.” We see the exercise of this power on Peter’s part in Acts 8:20-23. There is no indication that this power was bestowed upon Peter as a priest or as a pope, but simply as a Spirit-filled man.

First published in The King’s Business, January 1913, p. 38.

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

The Humanities Move Off Campus

By Victor Davis Hanson
City Journal

As the classical university unravels, students seek knowledge and know-how elsewhere.
Autumn 2008

Until recently, classical education served as the foundation of the wider liberal arts curriculum, which in turn defined the mission of the traditional university. Classical learning dedicated itself to turning out literate citizens who could read and write well, express themselves, and make sense of the confusion of the present by drawing on the wisdom of the past. Students grounded in the classics appreciated the history of their civilization and understood the rights and responsibilities of their unique citizenship. Universities, then, acted as cultural custodians, helping students understand our present values in the context of a 2,500-year tradition that began with the ancient Greeks.

But in recent decades, classical and traditional liberal arts education has begun to erode, and a variety of unexpected consequences have followed. The academic battle has now gone beyond the in-house “culture wars” of the 1980s. Though the argument over politically correct curricula, controversial faculty appointments, and the traditional mission of the university is ongoing, the university now finds itself being bypassed technologically, conceptually, and culturally, in ways both welcome and disturbing.

At its most basic, the classical education that used to underpin the university often meant some acquaintance with Greek and Latin, which offered students three rich dividends. First, classical-language instruction meant acquiring generic methods of inquiry. Knowledge was no longer hazy and amorphous, but categorized and finite. Classical languages, like their Western successors, were learned through the systematic study of vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. Such philological study then widened to reading poetry, philosophy, history, and oratory. Again, the student learned that there was a blueprint—a structure—to approaching education. Nothing could ever be truly new in itself but was instead a new wrinkle on the age-old face of wisdom. Novel theories of education and entirely new disciplines of learning—to the extent that they were legitimate disciplines—could take their place within existing classical divisions of finite learning, such as philosophy, political science, or literature.

More than just an educational buzzword, then, “interdisciplinary” represented a real unity among fields as diverse as numismatics, epigraphy, architecture, archaeology, philology, art, and literature. Reading Homer or Virgil evoked history, culture, geography, style, language, and philosophy. Poetry was not just the modern habit of breaking up prose into bits and pieces but a discipline of poetic language, meter, and subject matter. Oratory was not just speaking publicly but the art of metaphor, allusion, exaggeration, invective, and hyperbole. The formation of university departments, the concept of a core general-education curriculum, and the expectation that graduates would leave the university with certain skills and shared wisdom were all outgrowths of the study of classics and evolved over two millennia. Classics was not some esoteric discipline but a holistic way of thinking about the world that elevated reason over cant, fad, and superstition.

Second, classical education—reading Homer, Sophocles, and Aristotle, or studying the Delphic Charioteer and red-figure vase painting—conveyed an older, tragic view of man’s physical and mental limitations at odds with the modern notion of life without limits. Love, war, government, and religion involved choices not between utopian perfection and terrible misery but between bad and worse alternatives, or somewhat good and somewhat better options—given the limitations of human nature and the precarious, brief span of human life. Humility permeated traditional liberal arts education: the acceptance that we know very little; that as frail human beings, we live in an unforgiving natural world; and that culture can and should improve on nature without destroying it.

In this regard, the university living experience—on-campus residence, close association with professors at dinners, and attendance at university lectures—helped reinforce the abstract lessons of the classroom and promote a certain civic behavior. Students had a precious four years in such a landscape to prepare their intellectual and moral skills for a grueling life ahead. The university was a unique place; it thrived because liberal arts in the holistic sense simply could not be emulated by, or outsourced to, private enterprise or ad hoc self-improvement training.

Third, classical education was a window on the West. Study of Athenian democracy, Homeric epic, or Roman basilicas framed all exploration of subsequent eras, from the Middle Ages to modernity. An Aquinas, Dante, Michelangelo, or Montesquieu could be seen as reaffirming, adopting, modifying, or rejecting something that the Greeks or Romans had done first. One could no more build a liberal education without some grounding in the classics than one could construct a multistory house without a foundation.

Over the last four decades, various philosophical and ideological strands united to contribute to the decline of classical education. A creeping vocationalism, for one, displaced much of the liberal arts curriculum in the crowded credit-hours of indebted students. Forfeiting classical learning in order to teach undergraduates a narrow skill (what the Greeks called a technê) was predicated on the shaky notion that undergraduate instruction in business or law would produce superior CEOs or lawyers—and would more successfully inculcate the arts of logic, reasoning, fact-based knowledge, and communication so necessary for professional success.

A therapeutic curriculum, which promised that counseling and proper social attitudes could mitigate such eternal obstacles to human happiness as racism, sexism, war, and poverty, likewise displaced more difficult classes in literature, language, philosophy, and political science. The therapeutic sensibility burdened the university with the task of ensuring that students felt adjusted and happy. And upon graduation, those students began to expect an equality of result rather than of opportunity from their society. Gone from university life was the larger tragic sense. Few students learned (or were reminded) that we come into this world with limitations that we must endure with dignity and courage rather than deal with easily through greater sensitivity, more laws, better technology, and sufficient capital.

Political correctness, meanwhile, turned upside-down the old standard of inductive reasoning, the linchpin of the liberal arts. Students now were to accept preordained general principles—such as the pernicious legacy of European colonialism and imperialism and the pathologies of capitalism, homophobia, and sexism—and then deductively to demonstrate how such crimes manifested themselves in history, literature, and science. The university viewed itself as nearly alone in its responsibility for formulating progressive remedies for society’s ills. Society at large, government, the family, and religion were hopelessly reactionary.

As classical education declined and new approaches arose to replace it, the university core curriculum turned into a restaurant menu that gave 18-year-olds dozens of classes to choose from, the easiest and most therapeutic usually garnering the heaviest attendance. The result, as many critics have noted, is that most of today’s students have no shared notion of education, whether fact-based, requisite knowledge or universal theoretical methodologies. They either do not know what the Parthenon is or, if they do, they do not understand how its role as the democratic civic treasury of the Athenians was any different from—much less any “better” than—what went on atop the monumental Great Temple of Tenochtitlán. Most likewise could not distinguish Corinthian from Doric columns on their venerable campuses, or a frieze from a pediment on their administration buildings. For a brief four-year period, students inherit a now-foreign vocabulary of archaic terms, such as “provost,” “summa cum laude,” and “honorarium,” which they employ but usually do not understand. While the public may not fully appreciate the role that classical education once played, it nonetheless understands that university graduates know ever less, even as the cost of their education rises ever more. Any common, shared notion of what it means to be either a Westerner or an American is increasingly rare.

The universities apparently believed that their traditional prestige, the financial resources of their alumni, and the fossilized cultural desideratum of “going to college” would allow them to postpone a reckoning. But by failing in their central mission to educate our youth, they have provoked the beginnings of an educational counterrevolution. Just as the arrogance and ideological biases of the mainstream media have made them slow to appreciate technological trends and the growing dissatisfaction of their audience, so, too, are universities beginning to fragment, their new multifaceted roles farmed out to others that can do them more cheaply and with less political sermonizing.

The most obvious challenge to university predominance is technological—in particular, Internet-based education offered by private-sector virtual campuses masquerading as traditional universities. As the American workforce increasingly needs retraining and as higher-paying jobs demand ever more specialized skills, students are beginning to pay for their education on a class-by-class basis through distance learning. Online classes, which do not require campus residence or commuting, also eliminate the overhead of highly paid, tenured faculty, campus infrastructure, and such costly elements of undergraduate education as on-campus lectures and extracurricular activities.

Unfortunately, private online schools also do away with the old notion of offering liberal arts classes to enrich citizenship and enhance technological specialization. Perhaps their unspoken premise is that if universities do not believe in the value of teaching Western civilization as part of a mandated general-education curriculum, then why not simply go to the heart of the matter and offer computer-programming skills or aeronautical-engineering know-how without the pretense of a broad education? And who is to say that paid-by-the-hour instructors at the online University of Phoenix are less responsible teachers than their traditional counterparts? After all, their market-driven employers must serve a paying constituency that, unlike traditional university students, often demands near-instant results for its fees.

At American Military University, it’s worth noting in this light, online instructors receive compensation based on the number of students they teach, rather than the number of courses they offer. Cost-cutting measures are radical in the online education world. Bookstores and libraries become almost superfluous; instead, students simply pay fees for the use of Internet resources. The University of Phoenix actually negotiates deals with textbook publishers to make all of their books available online for a flat fee. The logic is to redefine education as an affordable product that finds its value in the marketplace among competing buyers and sellers.

It’s hard to fault these companies; they are serving a need. It would be reassuring, certainly, to think that a psychology student at Smith or Occidental would receive a broader understanding of the discipline, its history, and its place within the liberal arts than would a counterpart graduating from the far cheaper online Argosy University. But it would be far from certain.

Traditional colleges and universities, seeking to compete, have started to enter the online education market. The present university system is partly subsidized by low-paid, part-time faculty without tenure who teach large classes and thereby support a smaller mandarin cohort of tenured professors with full benefits, fewer students, and little worry about the consequences of poor peer reviews or student evaluations. Indeed, since the 1970s, the percentage of tenured and tenure-track professors in the academy has declined dramatically, as the university seeks to exploit the many to pay for the chosen, though dwindling, few. Schools are now starting to complement these two tiers with a third—a new sort of distance-learning adjunct, paid even less, who offers classes via the Internet and may never venture onto campus at all, but whose courses carry the prestige of a well-known university brand. An informal survey suggests that distance learning now makes up as much as 20 percent of total offered classes at some schools.

One can also see a growing cultural reaction to the modern university in the spread of conservative Christian colleges. According to the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, enrollment in such schools increased 70.6 percent between 1990 and 2004, versus 12.8 percent for public universities and 28 percent for all private universities. The national news media have split into genres predicated on political partisanship: network news, public radio, and large newspapers for liberals; and talk radio, cable news, and Internet sites for conservatives. So, too, have our mainstream universities, promising free thought but in reality indoctrinating their students, become increasingly distinct from religious colleges and universities that take pride in a more classical curriculum.

The religious schools are recognizing their market advantage. What was once the old Bible school has now often become the popular conservative antidote to the liberal university. Liberty University and Oral Roberts University have seen endowments and enrollments soar as they have broadened their mandates to encompass general cultural conservatism rather than solely religious orthodoxy. Liberty University is no longer Jerry Falwell’s weird and tiny Liberty Baptist College of the 1970s but has swelled to more than 20,000 undergraduate and graduate students, with another 4,500 enrolled in online graduate programs alone. Thirty years ago, Fresno Pacific College was a small evangelical Mennonite campus; today, its successor, Fresno Pacific University, is a generic traditional campus that offers an alternative to the cumbersome bureaucracy and politically charged culture of nearby California State University, Fresno. The teacher-credential program at Fresno Pacific’s education school, for example, has earned regional acknowledgment for being more rigorous, better organized, and freer from therapeutic and political biases than its much larger counterpart at CSU, Fresno.

The growth of classically minded religious colleges is not limited to the Protestant evangelical movement. Against-the-grain Catholic schools have flourished, too, offering an alternative not just to Berkeley, Wisconsin, and Amherst but also to increasingly liberal Notre Dame and Santa Clara, which have abandoned traditional Catholic themes and classical values. Thomas Aquinas College, founded in 1969, to take one example, has won recognition for its traditional curriculum. A few nonreligious schools, too, like Hillsdale College and St. John’s College, concentrate solely on the classical curriculum, offering Great Books–based courses whose very success serves as an effective critique of higher education elsewhere.

It’s no accident that millions of laypeople don’t find endowed professors at elite schools interesting or useful. Many public universities have rejected merit pay for faculty on the grounds that academic or teaching excellence is impossible to quantify. More elite private universities have embraced a star system of compensation, but in the liberal arts, the criteria of evaluation usually hinge on esoteric and jargon-laden scholarly publications, not teaching excellence. So those who wish to discover history or literature—to learn about the Founding Fathers or military history, say—often look outside the university, to public intellectuals on television and noted best-selling authors like David McCullough or John Keegan.

Private companies have made considerable profits by responding to the public hunger for inspired teaching of traditional liberal arts. The Teaching Company markets prerecorded lectures with rich content in history, literature, and other subjects from proven classroom stars, many of whom have found far less success under normal academic evaluation. Rosetta Stone’s software offers foreign-language instruction in dozens of languages, without the embedded cultural sermonizing that often characterizes foreign-language departments’ curricula. In a series of CDs from a company called Knowledge Products, marketed as “Giants of Philosophy,” the late Charlton Heston narrates excerpts from the seminal philosophers of the Western tradition. Consumers understand that they are buying the words of the philosophers themselves, read and explained by a skilled orator and actor, and skipping the postmodern jargon and leftist bias.

In the future, to learn professions, many students will enroll in specific classes to master accounting, programming, or spreadsheets, and not feel the need to study inductive reasoning or be equipped with the analogies and similes supplied by great literature and the study of history. If, later in life, graduates feel robbed of such a classical foundation, they can buy CDs and recorded lectures or take self-administered correspondence courses. Since universities are no longer places for disinterested investigation in the manner of Socratic inquiry, one can envision a future in which there will be liberal schools and conservative schools, and religious schools and antireligious schools. But the old, classical, unifying university will then have completed its transformation into a multiversity: knowledge, imbued with politics and ideology, will be fragmented, balkanized, and increasingly appropriated by for-profit companies.

Traditional colleges and universities aren’t about to die, of course. But their attractions—and especially the enticements of the Ivy League schools, Stanford, Berkeley, and such private four-year colleges as Amherst and Oberlin—will largely derive from the status that they convey, the career advantages that accrue from their brand-name diplomas, and the unspoken allure of networking and associating with others of a similarly affluent and privileged class. They are becoming social entities, private clubs for young people, certification and proof of career seriousness, but hardly centers for excellence in undergraduate education in the classical sense. For all the tens of thousands of dollars invested in yearly tuition, there will be no guarantee, or indeed, even a general expectation, that students will encounter singular faculty or receive a superior liberal arts education—let alone that they will know much more about their exceptional civilization than what they could find on the Internet, at religious schools, or on CDs and DVDs.

Once academia lost the agreed-upon, universally held notion of what classical learning was and why it was important, a steady unraveling process removed not just the mission but the mystery—and indeed, the beauty—from the American university. How ironic that the struggling university, in its efforts to meet changing political, technological, and cultural tastes and fads, willingly forfeited the only commodity that made it irreplaceable and that it alone could do well. And how sad, since once the university broke apart the liberal arts, all the religious schools, self-help courses, and CDs couldn’t quite put them together again.